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I. INTRODUCTION
Before 1990, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Delaware was a sleepy backwater. During the entire decade
of the 1980s, Phoenix Steel-whose only plant was located in
1934 [Vol. 55:1933
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Delaware-was the only large, public company to file there.1 In 1990,
two large, public companies-Continental Airlines and United
Merchants and Manufacturers-filed in Delaware. They constituted
7% of the twenty-nine large, public companies filing in the United
States that year.2 From 1990 to 1996, Delaware's market share
steadily increased to 87% (thirteen of fifteen cases).' In just seven
years, Delaware had become the bankruptcy reorganization capital of
the United States. 4
Lynn LoPucki and Sara Kalin recently suggested that the
Delaware bankruptcy court's spectacular success in winning market
share may have been accompanied by an equally spectacular failure in
the reorganizations that the court processed during those years.5
Their suggestion was based principally on an empirical finding that by
February 2000, nine of the thirty companies (30%) emerging from
bankruptcy reorganization in Delaware from 1991 to 1996 had filed
bankruptcy a second time.6 Excluding New York-which had a refiling
rate almost as high as Delaware's (23%)-only four of the seventy-five
large, public companies (5%) emerging from bankruptcy in other
courts during the same period filed a second time.7
LoPucki and Kalin's study made only a preliminary attempt to
discover the reasons for Delaware's higher refiling rate. But, as their
findings on the disparity of refiling rates gained wide publicity,8
bankruptcy scholars, lawyers, and judges offered a variety of possible
explanations. Most of those explanations sought to exonerate the
courts. Some argued that refiling is an inadequate measure of success,
1. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of Public Company
Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence of a "Race to the Bottom", 54 VAND.
L. REV. 231, n.6, 232 (2001).
2. Lynn M. LoPucki, Bankruptcy Research Database, at http:/lopucki.law-lib.ucla.edu
(last visited Oct. 30, 2002).
3. Id.
4. See Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An Empirical
Analysis of Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 967, 983-87
(1999) (describing the reasons for the shift in filings to Delaware).
5. See supra note 1, at 236 ("Paradoxically, large public companies in need of bankruptcy
reorganizations seem to be flocking to the courts least likely to reorganize them successfully."),
available at http://www.lexis.com (last visited Oct. 18, 2002).
6. See LoPucki & Kalin, supra note 1, at 250 (Table 5).
7. Id. at 250.
8. See, e.g., Peter Aronson, Study Faults Delaware Court, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 18, 2000, at B1
(summarizing the LoPuckilKalin study along with comments from lawyers); Jef Feeley,
Companies Are Not Getting Proper Bankruptcy Help, Study Says, BLOOMBERG NEWS, July 31,
2000 (same); Michelle Johnson, Has the Market Misgauged Delaware's Efficiency?, BANKR. CT.
DECISIONS: WKLY. NEWS & COMMENT, Aug. 10, 2000 (reporting that LoPucki & Kalin's high
refiling rate finding "has the academic community buzzing").
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because it ignores distressed debtors that fail without refiling.9 Some
argued that the firms filing in Delaware might have been more
difficult to reorganize because they had more complex capital
structures 10 or more serious business problems.11 Others argued that
Delaware's high refiling rate was economically efficient, 12 implying
that other courts should ease their standards and accept higher
refiling rates. Still others argued that it was impossible to know
whether Delaware was doing a worse job without knowing the
individual reasons that each reorganization failed. 13
This Article reports the results of a study designed to confirm
that Delaware's and New York's higher refiling rates indicate higher
failure rates and to begin the inquiry into the reasons for those higher
failure rates. Part II describes the universe of cases studied, the
sources of data, and the method by which the data were gathered.
9. Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Whither the Race? A Comment on the
Effects of the Delawarization of Corporate Reorganizations, 54 VAND. L. REV. 283, 294 (2001)
("The first problem with focusing exclusively on refiling rates is that a recurrence of financial
distress does not necessarily lead to a second bankruptcy proceeding."); David A. Skeel, Jr.,
What's So Bad About Delaware?, 54 VAND. L. REV. 309, 318 (2001) ("LoPucki and Kalin drop a
firm from their study, for instance, if it merges with or is sold to another firm during or after
bankruptcy. Yet a merger or sale may often be the best possible outcome for the creditors of the
firm."); E-mail from Tom Salerno, Partner, Squires, Sanders & Dempsey, to Lynn M. LoPucki,
Professor, UCLA School of Law (Sept. 22, 2001) (on file with author) (arguing that in
jurisdictions other than Delaware and New York, "there are sale plans or cases with a dominant
secured creditor such that if there's a plan default the secured creditor will foreclose").
10. See, e.g., Michelle Johnson, Chapter 22: Who's to Blame?, BANKR. CT. DECISIONS: WKLY.
NEWS & COMMENT, July 5, 2001 (quoting Harvard Business School Professor Stuart Gilson's
statement that it may be "a different and more complicated type of company that goes into
Delaware with a larger, more complex capital structure. So it is not fair to indict Delaware courts
for not doing their job."), available at http://www.lexis.com (last visited Oct. 18, 2002); Skeel,
supra note 9, at 319 ("First, the firms that file for bankruptcy in Delaware may have more
complicated capital structures-such as more classes of debt and stock-than firms that take
their cases elsewhere.").
11. E.g., Skeel, supra note 9, it 320 ("Second, the firms that file for bankruptcy in Delaware
may be the ones with the most serious business problems.").
12. See, e.g., id. at 312 n.16 ("[I]t is also quite possible that the benefits of a quicker and less
costly Delaware reorganization more than offset the greater likelihood of a second
reorganization."). Professors Rasmussen and Thomas agree with Professor Skeel, but only with
respect to prepackaged bankruptcies. See Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 9, at 291 n.29
(arguing that prepackaged bankruptcies are just efforts to determine whether a full-blown
Chapter 11 proceeding is necessary).
13. See Aronson, supra note 8, at B4 (noting that bankruptcy specialists, including New
York bankruptcy attorney Harvey Miller and Delaware bankruptcy attorney Mark Collins,
believe that "conclusions could only be drawn after the facts of each refiling are examined-but
not based solely on the number of refilings"); Michelle Johnson, What Other Legal Scholars
Think of the LoPucki/Kalin Study, BANKR. CT. DECISIONS: WKLY. NEWS & COMMENT, BCD
NEWS & COMMENT, Aug. 10, 2000 (quoting UCLA Law Professor Ken Kee, "It's not valid to jump
to the conclusion and say, 'Delaware must be bad.' You have to ask why the system in Delaware
doesn't work as well as elsewhere if you're measuring success in terms of refiling statistics."),
available at http://www.lexis.com (last visited Oct. 18, 2002).
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Part III describes four criteria for evaluating the success of
reorganized firms and applies them to determine whether Delaware
and New York reorganizations are less successful than
reorganizations in other courts. Part III concludes that in the five
years after emerging, Delaware- and New York-reorganized firms
refiled more often, failed to perform their plans more often, suffered
greater losses, and even went out of business due to financial distress
more often. Part IV compares, on several criteria, the firms entering
reorganization in Delaware and New York with those entering
reorganization elsewhere but finds no reason to believe that the
Delaware- or New York-reorganized firms differed in ways that made
them more difficult to reorganize. Part V considers and rejects the
claim that the two courts' high failure rates might be efficient. Part VI
examines several differences in the bankruptcy process as it operates
in Delaware, New York, and other courts, concluding that certain
differences in Delaware's reorganization process appear to contribute
to Delaware's high failure rates. Part VII offers some additional
conclusions and speculations on other, as-yet-untested features of
Delaware reorganization that might also contribute to Delaware's
high failure rates.
Because the phenomena we examine appear more distinctly in
the Delaware data than in the New York data, we focus our discussion
on Delaware. Some of the conclusions that we draw solely with respect
to Delaware, however, might also be drawn with respect to New York.
II. METHODOLOGY
This study analyzed the reorganizations of all companies that
(1) were large, public companies at the time they filed for
reorganization in a United States bankruptcy court and (2) emerged
from reorganization as operating public companies during the period
from January 1, 1991 to December 31, 1996. We chose this period
because the Delaware bankruptcy court began the period with no
market share, built to an 87% market share, and ended the period
"locked-in" as the preeminent reorganization court in the United
States. 14 Measured by the standard of the marketplace, it was a period
of astonishing success for the Delaware bankruptcy court.
The universe of eligible firms was identified from Lynn M.
LoPucki's Bankruptcy Research Database ("BRD"). 15 The application
14. From 1996 through 2001, 57% of all bankruptcy filings by large public companies in the
United States (123 of 215) were in Delaware. See LoPucki, supra note 2.
15. Under BRD protocols, a company is considered "public" at filing if it filed a Form 10-K
for a year ending within three years prior to its bankruptcy filing and if the company did not
20021 1937
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of the above criteria identified twenty-six Delaware reorganizations,
sixteen New York reorganizations, and fifty-six reorganizations in
other courts, for a total of ninety-eight reorganizations.
We obtained most of the financial data for the five years prior
to filing and the five years after the effective date of the plan 16 from
Compustat, a service that extracts that data from the firms' filings
with the Securities and Exchange Commission. For several firms,
Compustat had no data. For many, Compustat's data did not cover all
of the relevant years. For both groups of firms, we obtained some or all
of the data directly from the firms' SEC filings. We obtained
nonfinancial data principally from the BRD. The BRD data ultimately
came from a variety of published and unpublished sources, including
court files, SEC filings, newspapers, newsletters, and bankruptcy data
services.
We report data for three categories of courts. "Delaware"
indicates the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Delaware, which sits only in Wilmington. "New York" indicates the
Manhattan division of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of New York. 17 "Other Courts" indicates all United
States Bankruptcy Courts other than those sitting in Wilmington and
New York City. The methodologies employed with respect to
particular issues are explained in the relevant sections below.
take steps to go private more than one year before its bankruptcy filing. Lynn M. LoPucki,
Protocols for the Bankruptcy Research Database, Aug. 31, 2001 (draft on file with authors). A
company is considered public at emergence if it filed a 10-K for a year ending within three years
after confirmation of its plan. Id. Companies are considered "large" under those protocols if, on
their last 10-K filed prior to bankruptcy, they report total assets in excess of $100 million,
measured in 1980 dollars (or about $216 million in 2001 dollars). Companies that otherwise met
the requirements for inclusion, but whose plans provided for their gradual liquidation after
bankruptcy, were excluded.
16. "Effective date of the plan" is a term of art referring to the date on which the plan of
reorganization confirmed by the court becomes effective between the parties to the case. That
date is usually shortly after the "confirmation date"-the date on which the court entered its
order confirming the plan of reorganization.
17. Cases in other court locations in the Southern District of New York are heard by a
different panel of judges. With respect to venue and refiling, those cases more closely resemble
the cases of Other Courts than the New York City cases. For that reason, they are included in
the statistics for Other Courts.
[Vol. 55:19331938
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III. Do DELAWARE AND NEW YORK REORGANIZATIONS FAIL MORE
OFTEN?
A. Measured by Refiling
The data show that during their first five years, firms
emerging from Delaware bankruptcy court reorganizations refile more
often than firms emerging from Other Court reoganizations.
Specifically, firms emerging from Delaware reorganization were more
than ten times as likely to refile (42%) during this period than were
firms emerging from reorganization in Other Courts (4%) and more
than twice as likely to refile as firms emerging from New York
reorganization (19%) (Table 1). This difference in refiling rates is
statistically significant at the .001 level.
Table 1: Refiling Rates by Court
Bankruptcy Court
Status Delaware New York Other Courts Total
Not refiling 58% 81% 96% 84%
Refiling 42% 19% 4% 16%
N 26 16 56 98
Pearson chi-square = 19.585, df = 2, p < .001
B. Measured by Business Failure
The plans for each of the ninety-eight firms studied
contemplated that the reorganized firms would remain in business
indefinitely.18 In fact, only seventy (71%) remained in business for
even five years after confirmation (Table 2).19
18. In a few cases, plans provided that the firms would emerge as public companies but
would gradually liquidate after emerging. We omitted those firms from the study.
19. To determine whether a firm "remained in business" we applied the following criteria.
Neither the fact that the emerging firm acquired the stock of another firm nor that the emerging
firm's stock was acquired by another was by itself sufficient to classify the firm as discontinued.
That remained true even if the acquired firm was merged with an empty shell subsidiary of the
acquirer. But if the firms merged in such a manner that the assets of acquirer and acquired were
commingled in the ownership of a single entity (an "asset merger"), we considered the emerging
firm to have been discontinued. We made two exceptions. First, if the emerging firm was clearly
the dominant party in the transaction, we considered the emerging firm to remain in existence.
Second, the emerging firm's retention of its separate identity as a subsidiary immediately after
acquisition was not sufficient to consider it continuing if at the time of the acquisition the
acquirer expressed an intention to integrate the assets of the emerging firm into its business.
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Table 2: Business Continuation Rates by Court
Bankruptcy Court
Status Delaware New York Other Courts Average/
Total
Continuing 65% 75% 73% 71%
Not continuing 35% 25% 27% 29%
N 26 16 56 98
Pearson chi-square = .653, df= 2, p = .721
Although the proportion of Delaware firms surviving for five
years was lower than those for New York and Other Courts, the
differences among them were not statistically significant. Delaware's
lower survival rate may have occurred by chance.
Business continuation is, however, an imperfect measure of
success. Mergers and liquidations, even when they occur within a few
years after a plan that does not contemplate them, are not necessarily
business failures. Even a successful firm might merge into a larger
business, either because the deal is attractive or because a hostile
takeover eliminated its options. In theory, at least, even a piecemeal
liquidation might be a success from the standpoint of the firm's
investors if the pieces sell for a sufficiently high price.
The particular firms we classified as "liquidated" after
emerging were clearly failures of their earlier reorganizations. All
were liquidated through bankruptcy refiling, and all had negative
total earnings from the time they emerged from the first bankruptcy
until they filed the second bankruptcy. But many of the firms that
were discontinued through mergers had postreorganization earnings
exceeding those of firms continuing in business. On the whole, the
postreorganization earnings of firms discontinued by merger were
lower than the postreorganization earnings of continuing firms, but
the difference was not even significant. 20 We concluded that some of
the mergers were distress mergers tantamount to the failure of the
emerging firm's business, but that others were successes or something
in between.
20. We standardized profits by company size for purposes of comparing them. The profits
are expressed as percentages of the firms' sizes, with size calculated as the average of a firm's
total assets and sales. In this metric, the average profit after reorganization for merged firms
was -3% of firm size, which is not significantly different from the average profit after
reorganization for continuing firms (-1%) (N = 89, F = .584, df = 1, p = .447).
[Vol. 55:19331940
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To take account of this difference, we divided the merger cases
into two groups, classifying those with positive postbankruptcy
earnings prior to the date of merger as business "successes" (along
with all firms continuing in business for five years after confirmation)
and those with negative postbankruptcy earnings to the date of
merger as "failures" (along with all firms liquidating during the five
years after confirmation). 21 Using these classifications, Table 4 shows
the distribution of business success and failure by reorganization
court.
21. Of the twenty-eight firms that discontinued operations, six (21%) did so by liquidation,
while twenty-two (79%) did so by merger into other firms in such a manner that they lost their
separate existence. Table 3 shows what the data from Table 2 look like when the firms that
"merged" out of existence are distinguished from the firms that "liquidated." Theoretically, the
distinction is an imperfect one. But the six liquidations in the cases studied were all financial
disasters, and all six occurred in subsequent bankruptcy cases. These liquidations-the more
certain failures-tend to be concentrated in Delaware and New York, which in itself somewhat
undermines the conclusion that Delaware and New York's rate of business failure is no greater
than that of Other Courts.
Table 3: Business Continuation Rates by Courts,
Separating Mergers and Liquidations
Bankruptcy Court
Status Delaware New York Other Courts Total
Continuing 65% 75% 73% 71%
Merged 23% 13% 25% 22%
Liquidated 12% 13% 2% 6%
N 26 16 56 98
Pearson chi-square = 5.088, df = 4, p = .278
20021 1941
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Table 4: Business Failure Rate by Court
Bankruptcy Court
Status Delaware New York Other Courts Total22
Continuing or 76% 75% 88% 82%
merged without
distress
Liquidated or 24% 25% 13% 18%
merged in
distress
N 25 16 56 97
Pearson chi-square = 3.025, df = 2, p = .220
Our three-way categorization of the courts does a poor job of
explaining business failure. When we compare subsets, however, the
differences are somewhat significant. 23 The business failure rate
between Delaware and Other Courts is significant at the .10 level. 24
Moreover, when the Delaware cases are combined with the New York
cases into a single category, the difference between that combination
and Other Courts is significant at the .07 level. 25 Businesses
reorganized in Delaware and New York appear more likely to fail than
businesses reorganized in Other Courts.
C. Measured by Business Performance
The purpose of a business is to earn profits; a business that
does not do so can fairly be said to have failed. Profits reported on a
firm's income statement are admittedly an imperfect measure of
success, 26 but they are nevertheless a useful one.
22. Three firms emerged from reorganization twice during the period of this study. Both of
Memorex/Telex's reorganizations occurred in Delaware, and the company failed within five years
of the first emergence. LoPucki & Kalin, supra note 1, at 259-60. Memorex/Telex is counted as
only a single failure, because only a single firm failed. TWA emerged from one reorganization in
Delaware and a second in Other Courts and continued in business for more than five years after
the second emergence. Id. at 262-63. TWA is counted as a success for Delaware and Other
Courts. Lomas Financial emerged from one reorganization in New York and a second in Other
Courts and continued in business for more than five years after the second emergence. LoPucki,
supra note 2. Lomas is counted as a success for New York and Delaware.
23. p =.220.
24. Fisher's Exact p =.10 (one-sided).
25. Fisher's Exact p = .07 (one-sided).
26. Some consider particular kinds of businesses "successful" even though those businesses
have not earned profits. One example is Amazon.com, which was considered by many to have
been a successful business long before it reported a profit on an income statement. Another
DELAWARE AND NEW YORK
We collected two measures of profits for the first five full fiscal
years after the firm emerged from bankruptcy: profit (loss) 27 and
operating profit (loss) after depreciation. 28 The figure used for each
firm was the average for as many of the five years as were available. 29
To control for the sometimes widely differing sizes of the emerging
firms, the profits were expressed as percentages of the firms' sizes.
The size of a firm for this purpose was the average of its total assets30
and sales. 31
We calculated the averages and medians of the annual average
postbankruptcy earnings for the cases in each of the three
jurisdictions. The average earnings for Delaware-reorganizing firms in
the period after bankruptcy were negative in an amount equal to 9%
of the firm's entire size-an astonishingly poor performance (Table 5).
By contrast, firms reorganized in Other Courts on average had
positive earnings in amounts equal to 1% of their size. The median
earnings for Delaware firms were negative in an amount equal to 4%
of firm size each year, while the median Other Court firm had positive
earnings of 1% of firm size. The differences in earnings between courts
is highly significant.3 2 Firms emerging from Delaware reorganization
have consistently lower postbankruptcy earnings than firms emerging
from reorganization in New York or in Other Courts.
example is a business that provides tax benefits to its owners sufficient to provide a favorable
rate of return even if the business were never profitable by accounting measures.
At least one commentator on this Article suggested that we should have used cash flows
rather than profits as the measure of success. We rejected that measure because of the tendency
of cash flows to be tautological for firms in financial difficulty. That is, a firm in financial
difficulty is nearly always short of cash. The firm spends all the cash it can get and does not
spend more only because the firm does not have it. Thus, cash outflow tends to equal cash inflow.
27. Compustat Consultants, Inc., Compustat industrial annual data array codes, data item
number 172, at http://faculty.gsm.ucdavis.edu-data/anncodes.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2002).
28. Id., data item number 178. This measure is sometimes referred to as EBIT, earnings
before interest and taxes.
29. Many firms have short fiscal years immediately after their emergence from bankruptcy
or before their merger or liquidation. These short fiscal years were ignored. Unless data were
available for at least one full (twelve-month) fiscal year, the firm was treated as having no data
available.
30. Compustat, supra note 27, data item number 6.
31. Compustat, supra note 27, data item number 12.
32. p <.01.
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Table 5: Average Annual Profits During Five Years After
Emerging, as a Percentage of Firm Size
Operating Profits Profits
Average of Median of Average of Median ofCourt N N
Averages Averages Averages Averages
Delaware 1% 0% 25 -9% -4% 26
New York 4% 3% 15 -3% 0% 15
Other Courts 7% 6% 49 1% 1% 54
Total 5% 4% 89 -2% 0% 95
F = 5.529, df= 2, p = .006 F = 6.852, df = 2, p = .002
D. Measured by Plan Failure
The criteria of refiling and business failure are separate
measures of reorganization 'failure in that a firm's business can
completely fail without the firm refiling, and a firm can refile even
though its business has not completely failed. Thus, each of these
measures recognizes some failures not recognized by the other.
"Plan failure" is a criterion that recognizes both kinds of failure
simultaneously.33 That is, it treats a reorganization as a failure if the
firm refiles, liquidates, or distress-merges 34 within five years of
emerging. 35 By this criterion of failure, Delaware also fares poorly.
33. The name "plan failure" signifies that reorganizations that fail by this criterion either
do not perform their plans or perform them only technically, in a manner financially
disappointing to investors.
34. Our criteria for classifying a merger as "distress" are discussed in note 20 and text
accompanying note 21.
35. One additional kind of failure is possible-namely, default under a plan followed by a
workout agreement that enables the firm to remain in business. Only one of the firms, Amdura,
engaged in such a workout. Because Amdura merged within five years, its reorganization was
already counted as having failed. LoPucki, supra note 2, at http://lopucki.law-lib.ucla.edu (last
visited Oct. 30, 2002).
1944 [Vol. 55:1933
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Table 6: Plan Failure Rate by Court
Bankruptcy Court
Status Delaware New York Other Courts Total
Succeeded 46% 69% 86% 72%
Failed 54% 31% 14% 28%
N 26 16 56 98
Pearson chi-square = 14.053, df= 2, p = .001
Fifty-four percent of the Delaware reorganization plans failed
(Table 6).36 That figure compares with only 31% of New York plans
and 14% of Other Court plans. The difference between Delaware's
plan failure rate and the plan failure rate in New York or Other
Courts is statistically significant.37 The failure rate in Delaware was
three times the overall failure rate of New York and Other Courts
combined (18%).
Aside from its relevance as a direct measure of failure, plan
failure also serves an important methodological purpose in this study.
Because it identifies more failures than either the refiling or the
business failure measures from which it is composed, it yields
statistically significant results in tests where neither of those
measures do.
E. Conclusions
Delaware-reorganized firms were significantly more likely to
refile, significantly more likely to go out of business as a result of their
financial distress, and significantly less likely to perform successfully
under their plans of reorganization. They also had significantly lower
postbankruptcy earnings. These findings warrant the conclusion that
Delaware-reorganized firms emerging in the period from 1991 to 1996
failed more often than firms emerging from reorganization in Other
Courts.
36. Mergers are not necessarily failures in plan performance. In a typical merger, the
creditors of the emerging firm are paid in full, and the shareholders receive sufficient
consideration to prompt them to vote for the plan. They are failures in the sense that the
shareholders are in nearly all cases successors in interest of the former creditors of the
reorganized firm. In a distress merger less than five years after emergence, those shareholders
are unlikely to receive as much value as was assigned to their stock in the reorganization.
37. p =.001.
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IV. POSSIBLE FAILURE CAUSES EXOGENOUS TO DELAWARE
The data presented in Part III demonstrate that Delaware
reorganizations fail more often. But that fact alone does not prove that
Delaware's process is faulty. Two other possibilities remain. First,
Delaware's higher failure rate may reflect some differences among
Delaware-reorganizing firms that make them more difficult to
reorganize successfully. That is, characteristics of the firms choosing
Delaware, rather than characteristics of Delaware's reorganization
process, could be causing Delaware's high failure rates. Second, even if
the firms filing in Delaware and Other Courts were equally difficult to
reorganize, Delaware's higher failure rate might still be "efficient" if it
resulted from the taking of risks that were justified by the potential
returns.
Two propositions must hold for the difficulty of Delaware's
cases to cause Delaware's higher failure rates. First, some category of
cases must be more difficult to reorganize than others. Second,
Delaware must have more cases from that category. 38
A. What Firm Characteristics Make Reorganization Difficult?
Under one theory, a variety of characteristics might make a
firm more difficult to reorganize successfully. The firm's financial
distress may be more severe, its decline into distress more precipitous,
or its managers less skilled. The firm may be in a depressed industry,
a more competitive industry, or an industry with no future prospects.
It may be disadvantaged by the location of its plants, its poor relations
with regulators, or the patent holdings of its competitors. The firm's
lenders and suppliers may be unwilling to continue to deal with it.
The firm's creditors and shareholders may be hostile or unreasonable.
The firm may have alienated its customers.
Under a different theory, such factors might be expected to
have no significant effect on the rate at which reorganizations fail. If
the reorganization process functions well, participants can discover
the debtor's problems and resolve them. Managers can be replaced,
plants closed, and the objections of creditors, shareholders, and
customers met. If the firm's leverage is excessive, the firm can reduce
it. If the bargaining parties insist on unrealistic recoveries, the court
can force them back to the bargaining table by refusing to confirm an
38. The possibility that such a category exists is known as the problem of lurking variables.
A lurking variable is a variable that causes a correlation between two other variables-here,
between Delaware and failure. If the lurking variable is the true cause of Delaware's high failure
rate, then Delaware is not the cause.
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unfeasible plan. If operating problems might prevent the firm from
making substantial payments under the plan, the payments can be
reduced or eliminated almost entirely through an all-equity plan. In
the worst case-a firm incapable of paying even its operating
expenses-the solution is to liquidate the firm in the initial
bankruptcy case. Because the firm was not reorganized, there could be
no "failure" of reorganization as that term is defined in this study. 9
To determine which of these competing theories best fit the
data, we examined eleven factors that we suspected, or others
suggested, might make firms more difficult to reorganize. For each
factor, we tested for a relationship to each of three measures of failure:
refiling, plan failure, and postbankruptcy 'earnings. Only one of the
suspected factors appears related to success and failure-complexity
of capital structure. That relationship is not strong and runs in
apparently the wrong direction to explain Delaware's high failure
rates. It appears that none of the other ten factors makes firms prone
to failure, and hence none of the eleven factors can explain or excuse
Delaware's high failure rates. For presentation here, we have grouped
the eleven factors examined under three headings.
1. Degree of Financial Distress Prior to Filing
Eight of the eleven factors tested were measures of the
reorganizing firms' levels of financial distress prior to the firms' initial
bankruptcy filings. Those measures are leverage before bankruptcy,
abnormal leverage before bankruptcy, four measures of prebankruptcy
earnings, and two measures of decline in earnings in the year prior to
bankruptcy.
a. Prefiling Leverage
"Leverage" is the ratio of a firm's liabilities to its assets. High
leverage generally results in high interest expenses and the need to
apply high amounts of cash to repayment of debt. If leverage is
sufficiently high, the business cannot operate at a profit and cannot
meet its obligations as they become due.
39. LoPucki and Kalin's data show that Delaware reorganized a smaller proportion of its
caseload than did Other Courts. See LoPucki & Kalin, supra note 1, at 256 (showing Delaware
reorganizing only 30 of 38 cases (79%), while Other Courts reorganized 99 of 117 cases (85%)).
This suggests that if liquidations were taken into account, Delaware's failure rate would be even
worse than we report.
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We calculated the prefiling leverage of each firm at the last
fiscal year-end prior to filing by dividing the firm's liabilities by its
assets as shown on the firm's balance sheet.40
b. Abnormal Prefiling Leverage
Normal leverage ratios differ from industry to industry. To
illustrate, in 1996 the average leverage for grocery stores 41 was 80%,
while the average ratio for crude petroleum and natural gas
businesses was 48%.42 These differences probably reflect differing debt
carrying capacities. Consequently, a leverage ratio of 80% might
indicate deep financial distress for a crude petroleum business but no
financial distress for a grocery store chain.
To control for these differences, we constructed a variable that
indicates the leverage of each of the firms studied in relation to what
is normal for the firm's industry. We first calculated the average
leverage for all firms in each debtor's industry.43 We then subtracted
that average from the debtor's actual leverage to determine the
"abnormal prefiling leverage" for each of the firms studied. "Abnormal
prefiling leverage" for a firm is the excess of the firm's leverage over
the level normal in the industry.
c. Prefiling Losses
One might suppose that an unprofitable firm would be harder
to reorganize. 44 Firms cannot continue to lose money indefinitely. The
40. We rejected the alternative of using assets and liabilities as reported by the debtor in its
bankruptcy filings (petition values), because (1) book values were easier to obtain; (2) petition
values are often selected by the parties for strategic reasons and therefore may not be
comparable from case to case; and (3) book values are available in more cases than petition
values.
41. U.S. E.E.O.C., Standard Industrial Classification Code 5411, Standard Industrial
Classification Code Descriptions, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/jobpat/siccodes.html (last
visited Oct. 21, 2002).
42. U.S. E.E.O.C., Standard Industrial Classification Code 1311, Standard Industrial
Classification Code Descriptions, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/jobpat/siccodes.html (last
visited Oct. 21, 2002).
43. The average leverage was calculated from Compustat data for the firms' fiscal year
1996. In some instances, Compustat reported no firms with four-digit SIC Codes identical to
those of studied firms, but did report categories for which the first three digits were identical and
the fourth digit was "0." (Valid SIC Codes do not end in "0.") If that category was of sufficient
size, we used it for firms whose first three digits matched. For the remaining firms studied, we
used all Compustat firms for which the first three digits of the SIC Code matched the first three
digits of the studied firm's SIC Code.
44. In a recent study of seventy-eight emerging firms, Denning, Ferris, and Lawless found
that greater firm profitability in the last year prior to filing was correlated with successful
reorganization. See Karen C. Denning et al., Serial Bankruptcy: Plan Infeasibility or Just Bad
1948 [Vol. 55:1933
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more money a firm is losing before bankruptcy, the greater the
changes the firm must make to emerge successfully.
To test this seemingly obvious proposition, we examined four
measures of the firms' profitability in the period prior to the filing, of
the bankruptcy case. They are (1) profits in the last full fiscal year
prior to filing (profits in the year before filing); (2) operating profits in
the last full fiscal year prior to filing (operating profits in the year
before filing); (3) average annual profits for the last five full fiscal
years prior to filing (profits in the five years before filing); and (4)
average annual operating profits for the last five full fiscal years prior
to filing (operating profits in the five years before filing).45
Although all of the firms studied were large, some were much
larger than others. Profits or losses in a particular dollar amount
might have far greater consequences for a small firm than for a large
one. To control for the size of the firm, we expressed the amounts of
profits and losses as percentages of the sizes of the firms in which they
were incurred. The size of a firm for this purpose is the average of its
assets and sales in the last full fiscal year prior to filing.46
d. Recency of Decline in Prefiling Profits
A firm whose earnings declined immediately before bankruptcy
may be more difficult to reorganize than a firm whose earnings
declined earlier and then stabilized. We calculated recency of decline
in two variables: profits and operating profits. We defined recency of
decline as the difference between average annual profits in the five
years prior to bankruptcy and average annual profits in the year
before bankruptcy, expressed as a percentage of firm size.
We tested each of these eight factors against each of three
measures of success and failure: refiling, plan failure, and average
annual profits.47 For none of the three measures of success was the
Luck?, 8 APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 105, 108 (2001). The study included "all public serial bankrupt
firms over the sample period of 1970-1996." Id. at 106.
45. For some firms, data were available for some but not all of the five years prior to filing.
We used only full fiscal years and annual average figures so that we could include these firms.
Firms were included only if data were available for at least three of the five years, including the
year immediately prior to filing.
46. The sales and assets of large firms are, on average, about equal. But in some industries,
sales are much larger than assets, while in others, assets are much larger than sales. In a few
cases, sales and asset figures were not available for the year prior to filing. In those cases we
used the last available figures, but not figures for any date more than three years prior to filing.
47. A simple F-test was employed to analyze the relationship between the eight factors
(leverage before, abnormal leverage before, profits, operating profits, average profits for five
years preceding, average operating profits for the five years preceding, declining profits, and
declining operating profits) and our two binary measures of failure (refiling within five years and
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difference between the successful cases and the unsuccessful cases in
any of the eight factors statistically significant. The data provide no
reason to believe that the financial condition of a firm prior to
bankruptcy has any effect on its likelihood of reorganizing
successfully. 48
To illustrate the manner of this testing, we found no important
differences in prefiling leverage, statistical or otherwise, between
firms that refiled and those that did not. The mean and median
prefiling leverages for refiling firms were only slightly below those of
firms that did not refile for bankruptcy within five years (Table 7).
Table 7: Leverage Before Filing
Average Leverage Median Leverage Number
Before Filing Before Filing of Cases
Refilers 108% 95% 16
Nonrefilers 110% 100% 82
Total 110% 100% 98
100%: debt is equal to assets.
F = .036, df = 1, p = .850
Adjustment for differences in leverage from industry to
industry did not change the result. The mean and median values of
the abnormal prefiling leverage49 follow the same pattern as reported
for the unadjusted leverage before filing. There are no significant
differences in the industry-adjusted leverage of firms that refiled for
bankruptcy within five years and those that did not refile (Table 8).
plan failure). None of the analyses resulted in a p-value smaller than .35. Pearson's R correlation
was used to test the relationship between the eight factors and average annual profits after the
plan. None of the p-values associated with this operation was below .31.
48. These findings are consistent with those of Matthias Kahl. Financial Distress as a
Selection Mechanism: Evidence from the United States (October 2001) (unpublished
manuscript), at http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/acadunit/finance/wp/2001/16-Ol.pdf (last visited
Aug. 20, 2002). In a study of 102 firms in financial distress, Kahl found that "[tihe firm's leverage
ratio at the onset of financial distress has no statistically significant effect on survival, as it
should not in an efficient selection process." Id. at 3. He found "some weak evidence that size has
a positive effect on short-term survival." Id. However, that finding is opposite that which is
necessary to exculpate the Delaware and New York bankruptcy courts. During the period
covered by this study, the firms filing in Delaware and New York were somewhat larger than
those filing in Other Courts. See infra Part IV.B.
49. The method by which we calculated "abnormal leverage" is explained supra Part
IV.A.1.b.
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Table 8: Above-Normal Leverage Before Filing
Average Abnormal Median Abnormal Number of
Leverage Leverage Cases
Before Filing Before Filing
Refilers 42% 39% 16
Nonrefilers 50% 37% 82
Total 49% 37% 98
Cells are prefiling leverages above industry average.
F = .315, df= 1, p = .576
2. Size and Complexity of Capital Structure
a. Size
Prior research has shown a strong relationship between size of
the firm and success of the reorganization when success is measured
by confirmation or consummation of the plan. Larger firms are more
often successful than smaller firms.50 One reason may be that a large
firm has the option of closing unprofitable plants, divisions, or product
lines while continuing the remainder of its business, while small firms
may have only a single plant, division, or product line. None of those
studies, however, deals directly with the issue addressed here: the
success after confirmation of a business emerging from the
reorganization of a large, public firm.
To address that issue, we tested each of six measures of size:
(1) assets before bankruptcy;51 (2) assets after bankruptcy;5 2 (3) sales
before bankruptcy;5 3 (4) sales after bankruptcy; 54 (5) employees before
50. E.g., THEODORE EISENBERG, BUSINESS INSOLVENCY LAW: CREATING AN EFFECTIVE
SWEDISH RECONSTRUCTION LAW (Stockholm: Studieforbundet Naringsliv och Samhkille, Center
for Business Policy Studies, Occasional Paper No. 75, 1995) (reporting that Chapter 11
confirmation rates decrease monotonically with firm size: the rate is 96% for firms with assets
greater than $100 million, 36% for firms with assets between $1 million and $100 million, and
20% for firms with assets less than $1 million); Timothy C.G. Fisher & Jocelyn Martel, Should
We Abolish Chapter 11? Evidence from Canada, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 244-47 (1999)
(summarizing success rates under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, measured by
confirmation and consummation of plans, and concluding that success is substantially a function
of size).
51. "Assets before bankruptcy" is the total assets of the firm (Compustat, supra note 27,
data item number 6) at the last fiscal year-end prior to the bankruptcy filing.
52. "Assets after bankruptcy" is the total assets of the firm (Compustat, supra note 27, data
item number 6) at the first fiscal year-end after the effective date of the plan.
53. "Sales before bankruptcy" is the sales or net revenues of the firm (Compustat supra note
27, data item number 12) during the last fiscal year ending before bankruptcy.
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bankruptcy; 55 and (6) employees after bankruptcy,56 against each of
three measures of success and failure. For none of the three measures
of success-refiling, plan failure, and postbankruptcy earnings-was
the difference between the successful cases and the unsuccessful cases
for any of the six measures of size statistically significant. 57 The data
provide no reason to believe that within the population of relatively
large cases studied, smaller or larger firms were more difficult to
reorganize successfully.
b. Complexity of Capital Structure
In response to LoPucki and Kalin's findings, Professor David
Skeel suggested that Delaware's higher refiling rates may result from
Delaware-reorganizing firms having more complex capital
structures. 58 To further explore the relationship between capital
structure complexity and success, we gathered data on the number of
separate classes of claims and interests in the reorganizing firms'
confirmed plans of reorganization. 59 The number of separate classes
might be a measure of capital structure complexity because it
indicates the number of types of claims or interests that differed in
ways that required different treatment. The differences that result in
separate classification and treatment are usually differences in the
54. "Sales after bankruptcy" is the sales or net revenues of the firm (Compustat, supra note
27, data item number 12) during the first twelve-month fiscal year beginning after the effective
date of the plan.
55. "Employees before bankruptcy" is the number of employees of the firm (Compustat,
supra note 27, data item number 29) at the last fiscal year-end prior to the bankruptcy filing.
56. "Employees after bankruptcy" is the number of employees of the firm (Compustat, supra
note 27, data item number 29) at the first fiscal year-end after the effective date of the plan.
57. To prevent outlying cases from dominating the statistical tests, we used the natural logs
of assets, sales, and employees in each of the analyses. As with the previous tests, the
relationship between the size variables and refiling or plan failure was analyzed using a simple
F-test. None of the tests produced a p-value smaller than .30, and we therefore conclude that
these relationships are not significant. Pearson's R correlation similarly produced nonsignificant
results. Average annual profits after emergence from bankruptcy is not correlated with any of
the indicators of prebankruptcy size; none of the p-values falls below .20.
58. Skeel, supra note 9, at 319 (equating more complicated capital structures with "more
classes of debt and stock").
59. The numbers of classes were determined from the plan summaries prepared by the
BANKRUPTCY DATASOURCE, at www.lexis.com (last visited Oct. 18, 2002). We counted a group of
claims or interests as a separate class if the property the group was to receive under the plan
was determined differently from the property to be received by other groups. For example, if the
plan created two classes of claims against the same entity and treated them identically, we
considered them to be a single class. If the plan provided a separate treatment for unclassified
claims (typically administrative expense and priority tax claims), we treated them as a class of
claims. If the plan created separate classes for claims against or interests in different entities, we
presumptively treated them as separate classes. But if the plan expressly joined the classes
together in specifying identical treatment, we considered them a single class.
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holders' rights against the reorganizing firm. Separate classes
typically exist for unsecured debts of differing priority, stock with
different preferences, claims against different members of a corporate
group, and secured creditors with different priorities or different
collateral.
We tested the hypothesis that successful reorganizations are
related to complexity by examining our data on plan classes in light of
three measures of success. Under our two binary measures of success
(refiling and plan failure) the mean number of plan classes is larger
among firms that had successful reorganizations (Table 9). Of
particular interest is the relationship between plan failure and the
number of plan classes. Among firms whose reorganizations were
successful there were, on average, 16.8 separate classes in their plans;
while among firms whose reorganizations failed there were only 13.3
separate classes. The difference is statistically significant. 60 Even
under a more conservative definition of failure (refiling) the
differences among companies tend in the same direction; failed
reorganizations are less complex (12.8 plan classes) than the
successful ones (16.5 plan classes). This relationship is significant by
conventional standards. 61 Finally, the relationship between the
number of classes and postbankruptcy earnings (size-adjusted) is also
significant. 62
Table 9: Mean Number of Plan Classes 63 by Different Measures
of Failure
Failure Measure
Refiling N Plan Failure N
Successful 16.5 80 16.8 70
reorganizations
Failed 12.8 16 13.3 26
reorganizations
Total 15.8 96 15.8 96
F= 3.907, df 1, p = .051 F 5.054, df= 1, p = .027
60. p = .027.
61. p =.051.
62. Pearson's R =.202, p =.052.
63. Plan class has a skewed distribution. It has two extreme outlying values of 69 and 93,
with the balance of cases ranging between 5 and 34. We compensated for this distribution by
using the natural logs of plan class. Logging is a widely accepted linear transformation of data
comprised of counts and amounts that often results in normally distributed values. We used
these transformed values in our tests of statistical significance. The figures we report in the table
were computed by raising Euler's Constant to the mean of the logged variable.
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Measured by plan classes, capital structure complexity appears
to be related to success and failure. The direction of the relationship-
complex structures are associated with lower failure rates-is opposite
the direction that Skeel predicted: complex structures would be
associated with higher failure rates. If we adhere to Skeel's premise
that simple structures make reorganization easier, we must conclude
that Delaware has higher failure rates despite having an easier
caseload. Alternatively, we could abandon his premise and conclude
that complex capital structures make firms easier to reorganize
successfully. We are not comfortable with either alternative and so
return to the issue in Part IV.C.
3. Industry
In their study of large, public firms reorganizing from 1980 to
1996, LoPucki and Kalin found that manufacturing and retail trade
firms were significantly more likely to refile than firms in other
industries.64 Because the universe of cases we studied is a subset of
the universe studied by LoPucki and Kalin, we expected to find the
same relationship. We did not. None of the most likely groups-
manufacturers, retailers, or manufacturers and retailers combined-
was significantly more likely than other firms to fail.65
4. Multiple Regression Analysis
Table 10 shows the results of a multivariate analysis of the key
factors tested in the section above, with the addition of court location.
This analysis is motivated by the following proposition: Delaware's
record of plan failure is an artifact of difficult reorganizations. No
single measure of difficulty adequately captures this phenomenon, but
together these measures comprise an index of difficulty. To test this
proposition, we constructed a model that estimates Delaware's
exceptionalism while controlling for several exogenous factors that we
considered most likely to influence significantly the success or failure
of a reorganization plan: prefiling leverage, prefiling profits, industry
(here represented by membership in either the manufacturing or
retail industries), 66 firm size before filing (here represented by the
64. See LoPucki & Kalin, supra note 1, at 257.
65. Manufacturers and retailers combined had a refiling rate of 21% (n = 48), compared to
12% (n = 50) in all other industries. The difference is not significant (F = 1.390, df= 1, p = .241).
66. Analyzing data from a larger universe of cases and using single-digit SIC codes,
LoPucki and Kalin found a weakly significant relationship between industry and refiling and
found that manufacturing and retail trade firms were more likely to refile. LoPucki & Kalin,
1954 [Vol. 55:1933
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book value of assets prior to the first bankruptcy), and the complexity
of the reorganization (here represented by the number of plan classes).
In order to further test the validity of our "plan failure" variable, we
analyzed it in tandem with the more straightforward measure of
failure-refiling.
Table 10: Multiple Regression Analysis of Plan Failure
and Refiling
Plan Failure Refiling
Leverage Before Filing -.321 -.745
Mean = 1.100, sd =.462 (.883) (1.129)
Profits Before Filing (averaged over five years -1.843 -2.454
preceding filing and adjusted for firm size) (4.736) (6.376)
Mean = -.055, sd = .097
Manufacturing or Retail .011 .544
Mean = .490 (.589) (.769)
Number of Plan Classes (natural log) -.688 -.505
Mean = 2.760, sd =.468 (.809) (1.014)
Assets Before Filing (in millions, natural log) -.275 -.038
Mean = 6.511, sd = .994 (.327) (.390)
Delaware 1.945** 2.792**
Mean = .265 (.655) (.909)
New York 1.188 1.417
Mean =.163 (.795) (1.107)
Constant 2.122 -1.073
(2.417) (3.122)
N 84 84
Nagelkerke R2  0.25 0.33
Hosmer & Lemeshow Goodness of Fit X2 = 10.820, X2 = 6.631,
P =.212 P =.577
Cell entries are logistic regression coefficients (standard errors in parentheses).
***p <.001, **p < .01, *p < .05
If the proposition stated above is true, then we should find a
diminished or even insignificant relationship between court location
and plan failure after controlling for the difficulty of the
reorganization. Our analysis suggests that the proposition is false.
Delaware reorganizations fail significantly more often than New York
or Other Court reorganizations, controlling for exogenous factors.67
None of the other variables has an individually significant
supra note 1, at 257. Our analysis using single-digit SIC codes showed no significant relationship
between industry and refiling. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
67. Other Courts are represented in the intercept term. Delaware's significant coefficient
indicates that it is different from Other Courts, while New York's insignificant coefficient
indicates that it is not different from Other Courts. From this observation we infer that
Delaware is different from New York.
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relationship to plan failure or refiling.68 The lack of relationship
suggests that plan failure cannot be predicted from firm-specific
conditions that existed before the petition arrived at the courthouse.
B. Are Delaware-Reorganizing Firms Different?
We identified only one prefiling characteristic that made a
significant difference in firms' abilities to reorganize successfully:
capital structure complexity. That relationship was weak and appears
to run in the direction opposite that needed to explain Delaware's high
failure rates. The ten other characteristics we investigated appeared
unrelated to failure. Thus, no difference in those characteristics
between Delaware-reorganizing firms and Other Court-reorganizing
firms could explain Delaware's higher refiling rates.
Out of an abundance of caution, however, we tested to
determine if the population of firms choosing Delaware (or Delaware
and New York) was significantly different from the population
choosing Other Courts in any of the eleven characteristics examined.
Only two additional differences were statistically significant. Firms
reorganizing in Delaware and New York (combined) had significantly
higher average prefiling sales ($805 million) and prefiling numbers of
employees (5,792) than firms reorganizing in Other Courts ($488
million and 2,839 employees). 69 We found no other significant
differences between the firms that chose Delaware for their
reorganizations and the firms that chose Other Courts.
C. Conclusions
Eight of the eleven prefiling firm characteristics we examined
were measures of the firms' financial distress. None appears to be
related to the success or failure of the firms' reorganizations. To put it
another way, the likelihood of a successful reorganization does not
appear to depend upon the depth or suddenness of the reorganizing
firm's prefiling financial distress.
68. Exogenous factors also failed in two separate analyses that are not reported in the body
of this Article. One was a block analysis, in which exogenous factors were entered into the model
as a group. The goodness-of-fit measure, Nagelkerke R-squared, will change significantly if this
group has explanatory power, even if no single variable within the group is statistically
significant. The block did not increase the goodness-of-fit. The other analysis involved entering
factor scores created from the exogenous variables. Factor scores are estimates of the shared
variance of the variables (i.e., the "difficulty" a firm is experiencing). The factor scores did not
improve the explanatory power of the model, nor did they render Delaware's correlation with
plan failure insignificant.
69. p = .035 and p = .063, respectively.
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Nor did we find any relationship betWeen the sizes of firms or
their industries and the firms' likelihood of successful reorganization.
Earlier studies found such relationships in other contexts. 70 That,
together with the relatively small size of the universe of cases we
studied, causes us to be cautious in concluding that no such
relationship exists among firms generally. But if such a relationship
does exist, it is sufficiently subtle that it alone could not explain
Delaware's high failure rates.
We did find a weak relationship between "complexity of capital
structure," as measured by the number of classes of claims and
interests distinguished under- the firms' plans. We are, however,
skeptical. First, the relationship runs in the direction opposite that
expected: firms with more complex capital structures appear easier to
reorganize successfully. 71 Second, as we explain below, the number of
classes in plans may be more a product of the reorganization process
than of capital structure complexity.
Taken together, these data 'suggest that prefiling
characteristics of the firms filing in Delaware cannot explain
Delaware's high failure rates. Prefiling firm characteristics appear
unrelated to the success or failure of reorganizations, and firms
choosing to reorganize in Delaware do not differ grossly from firms
choosing to reorganize in Other Courts.
70. Denning et al., supra note 44, at 108 ("It was found that the coefficient for firm size is
significantly positive, indicating that larger firm size increases the likelihood of a successful
reorganization."); LoPucki & Kalin, supra note 1, at 258 (finding smaller firms more likely to
refile).
71. Any inference from our plan class data that Delaware-reorganizing firms have simpler
capital structures should be tempered by consideration of contrary evidence. The holders of
claims and interests of different members of a debtor's corporate group have different legal
rights. Those different rights constitute a complexity of capital structure. One would therefore
expect that corporate groups composed of larger numbers of entities would tend to have more
complex capital structures. Among the firms in the LoPucki and Kalin universe, the average
number of entities in groups reorganizing in Delaware was slightly higher than the average
number of entities in groups reorganizing in Other Courts. The difference was not statistically
significant. Lynn M. LoPucki, Can the Market Evaluate Legal Regimes? A Response to Professors
Rasmussen, Thomas, and Skeel, 54 VAND. L. REV. 331, 351 (2001) (Delaware-reorganizing firms
had an average of 26.5 entities per group compared to an average of 24.6 per group for the firms
reorganizing in Other Courts). This finding suggests that the capital structures of Delaware-
reorganizing firms are slightly more, not less, complex than the capital structures of firms
reorganizing in Other Courts.
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V. Is DELAWARE'S FAILURE RATE EFFICIENT?
A. Framing the Issues
LoPucki and Kalin presented data showing that firms
emerging from Delaware reorganization refiled more frequently than
firms emerging from reorganization in Other Courts. They
acknowledged that "[r]elatively high refiling rates are theoretically
defensible," because the refiling losses might be more than offset by
gains from a higher rate of reorganization or a greater magnitude of a
jurisdiction's successes. 72 LoPucki and Kalin did not think this defense
saved Delaware, however, because Delaware did not have a higher
rate of reorganization than other courts or obvious, dramatic
successes.
73
In separate replies to LoPucki and Kalin, Rasmussen and
Thomas and Skeel pressed the efficiency issue. Rasmussen and
Thomas argued that measurement of success and failure should take
both reorganizations and liquidations into account. They also argued
that lower direct costs of reorganization might more than offset the
cost of additional reorganizations in Delaware. Both Skeel and a well-
known, but unidentified New York bankruptcy lawyer concurred in
the latter argument. As the lawyer put it:
Very often the right solution is to do a fix that lasts for a period of time and, if it doesn't
work, do it again. That's how the workout world works. When you're talking about big
companies, it's just a workout under court protection. Why is that such a bad outcome?
[Some] will say it's a bad outcome because that's not what the statute provides for. But a
good outcome may be different than what the statute really requires. [The statute]
doesn't contemplate incremental restructurings. A judge has to make a determination
about plan feasibility, but if no one opposes [the plan] and it turns out not to work,
what's wrong with using the same mechanism a second time? 74
The data show dramatically what is wrong with using the same
mechanism a second time. Between the first and second bankruptcies,
the refiling firms suffered huge losses. Our data fix those losses at
18% of firm size per year during the five years after emergence. 75 By
comparison, firms that did not refile averaged profits of 1% of firm size
per year. In a related study, LoPucki found that the nine Delaware-
reorganized firms that refiled averaged operating losses alone of 18%
72. LoPucki & Kalin, supra note 1, at 255.
73. Id. at 255-56.
74. Michelle Johnson, Chapter 22: Does It Matter?, BANKR. CT. DECISIONS: WKLY. NEWS &
COMMENT, Aug. 1, 2001 (quoting an unidentified "well-known New York bankruptcy attorney").
But see id. (stating that "most turnaround professionals are completely outraged at an answer
like that [of the unidentified attorney]"), available at www.lexis.com (last visited Oct. 18, 2002).
75. See infra Part VI.A.
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of the firms' prefiling assets. 76 The losses associated with a failed
reorganization are huge. The fact that Other Court-reorganized firms
refiled at one-tenth the rate for Delaware-reorganized firms suggests
that the bulk of those losses were avoidable.
The mere fact of these avoidable losses does not prove
Delaware reorganization is inefficient. The possibility remains that
they can be offset by advantages of the Delaware bankruptcy process.
Six potential sources for such an offset can be identified: (1) Delaware
might have saved firms that would have been liquidated in Other
Courts; (2) Delaware might have liquidated firms more efficiently
than Other Courts; (3) Delaware might have accepted more risk in
reorganized firms to capture even greater gains from the partial
liquidations of those firms before confirmation; (4) Delaware might
have had more success among the firms that emerged as private firms
than among the firms we studied-only those that emerged as public
firms; (5) direct costs of reorganization might have been lower in
Delaware; and (6) indirect costs might have been lower in Delaware.
Each of these potential sources will be considered separately.
B. Does Delaware Have an Offset?
The data presented in Part III demonstrated that firms
emerging from Delaware reorganization had significantly lower
earnings and failed significantly more often in the ensuing five years.
Our study was confined to emerging firms. We did not examine
complete or partial liquidations that occurred during the first
bankruptcy, the costs incurred by the firms in their initial
bankruptcies, or emerging private firms. Thus, it is possible that
Delaware's poor performance in the respects that we did study misses
a larger picture in which Delaware performed well. We think this
possibility can be assessed by examining six potential sources for a
comparative Delaware advantage.
1. From Reorganizing a Larger Proportion of Firms
Saving firms may yield much larger gains than liquidating
them. If Delaware had a higher failure rate because it was attempting
to save firms that Other Courts would have liquidated, that higher
failure rate might nevertheless be efficient. To illustrate, assume that
four firms file in Delaware and that an identical set of four other firms
file in Other Courts. One firm in each set is certain to fail, one firm is
76. See LoPucki, supra note 71, at 338.
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certain to succeed, and two firms each have a 50% chance of success.
Each firm is worth one if it liquidates (at bankruptcy or upon later
failure) and three if it reorganizes successfully. Delaware reorganizes
all of its firms except the one certain to fail. Other Courts reorganize
only the firm certain to succeed.
On these facts, the expected failure rate for Delaware would be
33%. Delaware would attempt three reorganizations and, on average,
two would succeed. Other Courts would attempt only the
reorganization certain to succeed, giving them a failure rate of zero.
The expected value from the Delaware bankruptcy process would be
eight (two successful reorganizations at three each and two
liquidations at one each), while the expected value from the Other
Court bankruptcy process would be only six (one successful
reorganizations worth three and three liquidations worth one each).
No evidence exists, however, that Delaware is attempting to
reorganize more marginal firms. To the contrary, LoPucki and Kalin
found that during the period studied, Delaware reorganized a smaller
percentage of the firms filing there than did Other Courts.77
2. From Better Results in Complete Liquidations
Rasmussen and Thomas criticized LoPucki and Kalin for
attempting to evaluate Delaware reorganization without taking
Delaware liquidation into account. 78 They implied that Delaware
might have liquidated assets for higher prices than Other Courts,
thereby achieving a success that went unrecognized under LoPucki
and Kalin's methodology and that will go unrecognized under ours as
well.
Even if that is so, it in no way detracts from the validity of our
finding that Delaware reorganizations fail more often. Complete
liquidation and reorganization are mutually exclusive processes. A
firm can do one or the other, but not both. No interrelationship has
been suggested between the two that might, for example, cause a
court's reorganization success rate to fall because its liquidation
success rate rises. Thus, it makes sense to study the success of
reorganizations separately from the success of complete liquidations. 79
77. LoPucki & Kalin, supra note 1, at 256 (showing that Delaware reorganized 79% of the
firms that filed there after 1989 and whose cases were disposed of before 1997, while the
corresponding proportion for Other Courts was 85%).
78. Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 9, at 298.
79. Studying them together may be impossible because the "success" of liquidation-
obtaining a high price for assets in relation to their intrinsic value-would be difficult to
operationalize. The "intrinsic value" of assets is merely a theoretical construct not linked to any
measurable parameter.
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If Other Courts have a better reorganization process, Delaware could
copy it without impairing any advantage that Delaware may have in
liquidations.
3. From Better Results in Partial Liquidations
The argument in the preceding section does not apply to partial
liquidation cases. In partial liquidations, only some assets are
liquidated. The cash received from liquidation may be used in the
reorganization or distributed to parties in interest. Because the
liquidation and the reorganization occur with respect to the same
firm, they are interrelated. Liquidating the best assets may maximize
the bankruptcy dividend to creditors but reduce the likelihood of a
successful reorganization of what remains.
To illustrate the interrelationship, assume that every firm is
composed of two businesses. One is a strong business that has a
liquidation value of ninety, a reorganization value of 200, and a 50%
chance of surviving reorganization; the other is a weak business that
has a liquidation value of ninety, a reorganization value of 400, and a
25% chance of surviving reorganization. Further assume that the firm
can continue neither business without the cash infusion that would
come from liquidation of the other.
In such a world, every firm should reorganize one of its two
businesses. In the absence of risk aversity, it does not matter which.
Either business has an expected value of 100.
Now assume that something in the reorganization process of
Delaware causes the firms filing there to choose to reorganize the
weak business, while something in the reorganization process of Other
Courts causes the firms filing there to choose to reorganize the strong
business. The courts' processes would be equally efficient, generating
an average of 100 in value from each filing firm, but the Delaware
court would have a 75% failure rate, while the Other Courts would
have only a 50% failure rate. Delaware would appear worse, even
though it was not.
Similarly, firms that liquidate their strongest assets and keep
their weakest assets may be able to distribute substantial cash to
their investors but only at the cost of an increased risk of refiling.
Firms that liquidate their weakest assets and keep their strongest
assets may distribute little cash but minimize the risk of refiling.
Neither necessarily produces more value for investors.
Despite the theoretical possibility of such an offset between
successful partial liquidation and failed reorganization, (1) no
evidence exists that Delaware has an advantage in liquidation, and (2)
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even if such an advantage exists, it is unlikely to be large enough to
offset the entire difference in reorganization failure between Delaware
and Other Courts.
The latter statement is based on our finding that relatively
little shrinkage in firm size occurred during reorganization.8 0
Specifically, we found that on average, Delaware-reorganizing firms
shrank by 20% in dollar value of assets; the corresponding figures for
Other Courts and New York were 22% and 29% respectively.81 Table
11 shows that in 75% of the reorganizing firms, assets after
bankruptcy were more than 50% of assets prior to bankruptcy.8 2
Table 11: Asset Shrinkage During Reorganization
Emerging Company LoPucki & Whitford LoPucki & Doherty
Assets as a Confirmed 1981-88 Confirmed 1991-96
Percentage of Filing
Company Assets Number Percentage Number Percentage
Over 90% 2 7% 30 31%
51%-90% 9 31% 43 44%
50% -10% 11 38% 20 20%
Under 10% 7 24% 5 5%
Total 29 98
These data suggest that the proportion of assets liquidated is
substantially less than the proportion reorganized. For Delaware's
spectacular reorganization failures to be fully offset by Delaware's
liquidation successes, the liquidation successes would have to be
substantially more spectacular than reorganization failures. That
seems improbable.
4. From Firms Emerging Privately
Our data represent only firms emerging as public companies.
Failure rates for the 48% of firms emerging as private companies may
80. Our method for calculating shrinkage is described infra, in Part VI.C.
81. These figures may tend to understate shrinkage, because they are averages that include
some increases in firm size. On the other hand, they may tend to overstate shrinkage, because
reductions in assets may have come from write-downs in the values of assets rather than from
sales of assets, and liquidated assets may have yielded proceeds substantially less than their
book values.
82. Table 11 also shows the corresponding percentages for twenty-nine firms that
reorganized before the era of Delaware. The proportions of assets liquidated during that period
appear to have been greater. The difference is significant at the .001 level.
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be different. The data gathered by LoPucki and Kalin regarding
refiling rates, however, cover firms emerging as private companies as
well. Those data suggest that Delaware's failure rates among private
firms are nearly as bad as Delaware's failure rates among public
firms.83 LoPucki and Kalin used refiling as the sole measure of
success, but no reason exists for thinking that the data regarding
other measures of failure would be different.
5. From Savings on the Direct Costs of Bankruptcy
In their reply to LoPucki and Kalin, Rasmussen and Thomas
argued that savings from lower direct costs of reorganization in
Delaware might provide some offset.8 4 To quantify their point, they
offered the following formula for calculating the direct cost of a firm's
choice of Delaware for its bankruptcy:
Cd = D + 6pD
where Cd is the total cost of choosing Delaware, D is the direct cost of a
Delaware bankruptcy, 3 is the discount rate, and p is the probability of
refiling.85 Intuitively, the total direct cost of filing a case in Delaware
is the cost of a Delaware case, plus the probability of a refiling times
the cost of the refiling, the latter term reduced to present value as of
the time of the initial choice. That total direct cost is to be compared
with the total direct cost of filing in Other Courts, which is given by
the following formula:
Co = 0 + 5qO
where co is the total direct cost of choosing an Other Court, 0 is the
direct cost of an Other Court bankruptcy, b is the discount rate, and q
is the probability of refiling.
Using LoPucki and Kalin's probabilities of refiling, .3 for
Delaware and .1 for Other Courts, and hypothesizing that Delaware's
direct cost of reorganization would be 80% of that for Other Courts,8 6
83. The comparison is difficult to make because LoPucki and Kalin reported refiling rates
as percentages for all years they followed the firms (ranging from less than one year to seventeen
years) and as percentages per year. See LoPucki & Kalin, supra note 1, at 238-39. We report
failure rates for the five-year period after emergence.
84. Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 9, at 295-97.
85. Id. at 297. Their formula for Delaware was misprinted; we rely here on their formula for
Other Court filings, which was correctly printed.
86. Id.
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Rasmussen and Thomas calculated a substantial direct cost advantage
to filing in Delaware.8 7
No data currently exist regarding the comparative direct cost of
reorganizing in Delaware versus Other Courts during the period from
1991 to 1996. But Eisenberg and LoPucki have compiled data
comparing the direct costs of reorganization for fourteen Delaware
firms with those for ten Other Court firms during the period 1998 to
2001. Those data show the cost of Delaware reorganization to be 94%
of the cost of Other Court reorganization.88 Plugging that figure, along
with the refiling rates from the instant study, into Rasmussen and
Thomas's formula and assuming a relatively high discount rate of 30%
to favor Delaware, we get for Delaware:
Cd = .94 + (.3 x .42 x .94) = 1.06
and for Other Courts:
c = I + (.3 x.04 x 1) = 1.01
The direct total costs of Delaware reorganization are 1.06, 5% higher
than the direct total costs of Other Court reorganization, 1.01.
Because the total direct costs of Delaware reorganization actually
exceed those of Other Court reorganizations, they provide no offset.
6. From Savings on the Indirect Costs of Bankruptcy
As is discussed further below, the Delaware reorganizations
studied were significantly faster than the other reorganizations
studied.8 9 The magnitude of the difference is shown in Table 12.
87. Id.
88. Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki, Attorney Fee Study/Current Data
(unpublished spreadsheet, on file with the author).
89. See infra Part VI.D.-E.
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Table 12: Average Days in Reorganization
Delaware New York Other Courts Total
Prepackaged 14 cases 3 cases 10 cases 27
cases 48 days 55 days 75 days cases
Nonprepackaged 12'cases 13 cases 46 cases 71
cases 454 days 956 days 675 days cases
All cases 26 cases 16 cases 56 cases 98
236 days 787 days 568 days cases
The indirect costs of bankruptcy are generally understood to be
the reductions in earnings resulting from two types of harm. First,
persons who have been dealing with the firm-including customers,
employees, suppliers, and financiers-become concerned about its
future. They may refuse to continue dealing. That may in turn reduce
earnings directly, through increase in costs or loss of revenues, or
indirectly, by disrupting firm operations. Second, the time and
attention of management is diverted from firm operations to dealing
with those disruptions and with legal matters arising from the
bankruptcy, thereby reducing management's effectiveness. One might
reasonably suppose that the longer the bankruptcy case continues, the
greater these indirect costs would be.
The speed of Delaware reorganization probably tends to reduce
these two kinds of harm and thus to provide some offset against
refiling losses. But that offset is probably considerably less than Table
12 suggests. First, the period of embarrassment and disruption
associated with bankruptcy does not begin or end with the bankruptcy
case. The period of embarrassment and disruption begins when the
firm's financial problems become public-typically a few months to a
few years before filing. Unless Delaware has as great a speed
advantage during this prebankruptcy period as it has during
bankruptcy, the effect will be to dilute the gains suggested by the
Table 12 data. Nor do the indirect costs of reorganization end with the
confirmation of a plan. Customers, employees, suppliers, and
financiers may still have their doubts about the reliability of the firm.
In light of Delaware's higher failure rates, those doubts may be
greater with respect to Delaware-reorganized firms.
Second, much of Delaware's speed advantage results from its
greater proportion of prepackaged cases. Prepackaged cases do not
begin with the filing of the petition. They begin with the preparation
and submission of a plan of reorganization to a vote of the creditors in
the period before the filing of the petition. This same process takes
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place during a nonprepackaged case. Because the voting on
prepackaged plans is both public and expressly in contemplation of a
possible bankruptcy, the indirect costs associated with the prefiling
negotiation and voting are probably nearly as great as those
associated with actually being in bankruptcy. Prior research
comparing the length of the reorganization process found the
prepackaged process to be 25% shorter than the nonprepackaged
process. 90 Thus, while shorter cases in Delaware imply lower indirect
costs in Delaware reorganization, Delaware's advantage in this regard
is probably far less than its disadvantage in refiling costs.
C. Conclusions
Part III of this Article showed that Delaware reorganizations
failed more frequently than Other Court reorganizations. Part IV
showed that the difference in outcomes did not merely reflect a
difference in the filing firms. Before bankruptcy, the
Delaware-reorganizing firms were not measurably different from
Other Court-reorganizing firms. Those two propositions alone,
however, do not prove Delaware reorganization inefficient. Delaware
reorganization might nevertheless have yielded some benefit for which
our methodology did not account.
This part considered six possible Delaware advantages that
would not have been evident in our data. A combination of our data
and data from other studies negates the existence of three of the six.
First, the effects of Delaware's higher failure rates cannot be offset by
Delaware's reorganization of a greater proportion of its cases, because
Delaware, in fact, reorganizes a smaller proportion of its cases.
Second, LoPucki and Kalin's data substantially refute the possibility
that Delaware better reorganizes firms that emerge as private firms.
Third, our data, combined with Eisenberg and LoPucki's attorney-fee
data and Rasmussen and Thomas's formulae, show that the direct
costs of Delaware filing and refiling exceed the direct costs of Other
Court filing and refiling.
Because our study did not include complete liquidation cases,
we do not know whether Delaware has a comparative advantage in
processing them. If such an advantage indeed exists, it exists in
different cases than the reorganization cases we studied and so is
independent of them. It cannot explain or justify Delaware's poor
performance in reorganization cases.
90. Elizabeth Tashjian et al., Prepacks: An Empirical Analysis of Prepackaged
Bankruptcies, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 135, 142 (1996).
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Because our data do not cover partial liquidations that
occurred during the firms' initial bankruptcies, our data do not negate
the possibility that Delaware outperformed Other Courts in partially
liquidating assets. Our data do, however, indicate that substantially
fewer assets were liquidated than were reorganized in the cases
studied, making it highly unlikely that even a great performance in
the small partial liquidations could offset Delaware's poor
performance in large reorganizations.
Lastly, the speed of Delaware reorganizations probably does
give Delaware a comparative advantage with respect to the indirect
costs of bankruptcy. But here also, it is unlikely that advantage could
be great enough to offset the Delaware-reorganized firms' greater
losses in the postbankruptcy period. On the whole, we think it is fair
to conclude that Delaware's failure rates were probably higher than
efficient during the period studied.
VI. POSSIBLE FAILURE CAUSES ENDOGENOUS TO DELAWARE
If, as we concluded in Part IV, Delaware did not get more
difficult cases and, as we concluded in Part III, Delaware got worse
results from its cases, the problem must be with some aspect of
Delaware's reorganization process. In this part, we report on our
efforts to identify the ways in which Delaware's process differs from
that of Other Courts and to determine the mechanisms by which those
differences might lead to failure.
A. Postbankruptcy Earnings
In Part III.C, we described our data on the earnings of the
reorganized firms during the five years after reorganization.
Throughout this Article, we have employed postbankruptcy earnings
as a measure of success and failure. In this section, postbankruptcy
earnings take on a second role, as a mechanism that helps to explain
how reorganizations fail. In this regard, our empirical findings track
the conventional wisdom. Firms with lower postbankruptcy earnings
were more likely to fail.9 ' To illustrate, refiling firms had average
annual losses equal to 18% of company size, while nonrefiling firms
had average annual profits equal to 1% of company size. When
operating profits are used as the measure, the corresponding figures
were losses equal to 3% of company size for refilers and gains equal to
91. See, e.g., Kahl, supra note 48, at 25 ("To summarize, operating performance has a
statistically and economically significant and positive effect on survival.").
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6% of company size for nonrefilers (Table 13). The differences are
statistically significant with respect to both profits and operating
profits.
Table 13: Average Annual Profits During Five Years After
Emerging, for Refilers and Nonrefilers
Operating Profits Profits
Average Median Cases Average Median Cases
Refilers -3% -3% 15 -18% -12% 15
Nonrefilers 6% 5% 74 1% 0% 80
All 5% 4% 89 -2% 0% 95
F = 23.148, df= 1, p <.000 F = 50.756, df= 1, p < .000
Not surprisingly, refilers tend to be firms that have been
suffering substantial postbankruptcy losses. 92 Low postbankruptcy
earnings probably lead to failure, because unexpectedly low earnings
leave the firm with insufficient funds to make payments under the
plan or perhaps even to continue in business.
As noted in Part III.C (Table 5), firms reorganizing in
Delaware have significantly lower postbankruptcy earnings than firms
reorganizing in Other Courts. Yet, as noted in Part IV.B, firms
reorganizing in Delaware did not have significantly lower
prebankruptcy earnings than firms reorganizing in Other Courts. The
lack of a significant difference in the firms entering Delaware and
Other Court reorganization, combined with the presence of a
significant difference in the firms emerging from the two, suggests
that some difference between Delaware's and Other Courts'
reorganization processes causes the difference in postbankruptcy
earnings. We conclude that the Delaware reorganization process is
less effective in dealing with debtors' business problems than are
Other Courts' reorganization processes. Delaware's process fails to fix
the business.
92. The results were similar using plan failure as the measure of success, but they are
tainted by the fact that postbankruptcy earnings were used to determine which mergers should
be regarded as "failures" in the calculation of plan failure. Thus, the relationship between
postbankruptcy earnings and plan failure is in some part tautological.
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B. Postbankruptcy Leverage
The conventional wisdom holds that excessive postbankruptcy
leverage causes reorganizations to fail. Our data are consistent with
that wisdom but only weakly so. Refilers tend to be firms that
emerged from bankruptcy with higher leverage (Table 14),93 but the
difference between refilers and nonrefilers is not at a level
conventionally considered significant.94 Our plan failure variable is
more strongly related to leverage. The findings trend the same way
(failures have higher leverage), and the differences are significant. 95
Table 14: Postbankruptcy Leverage by Plan Success or Failure
Failure Measure
Refiling N Plan Failure N
Successful 78% 82 77% 71
reorganizations
Failed 87% 16 86% 27
reorganizations
Total 79% 98 79% 98
F = 2.468, df= 1, p = .19 F = 3.807, df = 1, p = .054
As noted earlier, average firm leverage varies by industry. 96
When we control for leverage differences among industries, we see
that refilers tend to have higher abnormal postbankruptcy leverage,
but the difference is not significant (Table 15). Nor is abnormal
postbankruptcy leverage related significantly to plan failure. 97
We define leverage as total liabilities divided by total assets.
p = .119.
p = .054.
See supra text accompanying notes 37-38.
p = .271.
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Table 15: Abnormal Postbankruptcy Leverage by Plan Success
or Failure
Failure Measure
Refiling N Plan Failure N
Successful 17% 82 16% 71
reorganizations
Failed 21% 16 22% 27
reorganizations
Total 18% 98 18% 98
F= .385, df= 1, p = .537 F = 1.225, df = 1, p = .271
Our other measure of success, postbankruptcy earnings, is also
related to postbankruptcy leverage. Unadjusted postbankruptcy
leverage is negatively correlated with postbankruptcy earnings. 98
Abnormal postbankruptcy leverage is negatively correlated with
postbankruptcy earnings.9 9 Firms with high postbankruptcy leverage
tend to be firms with low postbankruptcy earnings. Thus, while the
relationship between postbankruptcy leverage and postbankruptcy
failure may not be strong, postbankruptcy leverage does appear to
contribute to low postbankruptcy earnings.
Delaware-reorganizing firms had higher postbankruptcy
leverage than firms reorganizing in New York or Other Courts. Debt
averaged 86% of assets among Delaware firms, compared to 77% in
Other Courts and 78% in New York (Table 16). A similar relationship
existed among the courts with regard to abnormal postbankruptcy
leverage, but these differences are not statistically significant. The
only difference that approaches significance is the one between
Delaware and Other Courts (excluding New York), 100 but when
leverage is adjusted for industry, the significance of this difference
evaporates.101
98. Pearson's R= -.186, p =.070.
99. Pearson's R = -.193, p =.061.
100. p = .080.
101. p = .466.
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Table 16: Postbankruptcy Leverage by Court
Leverage Abnormal Leverage Cases
After Emerging After Emerging Cases
Delaware 86% 21% 26
New York 78% 18% 16
Other Courts 77% 16% 56
Total 79% 18% 98
F = 1.540, df = 1, p = .220 F= .276, df = 1, p = .759
Thus, while the Delaware firms studied had higher
postbankruptcy leverage, we cannot reject the possibility that the
difference resulted from chance.
The apparent weakness of the correlation between high
postbankruptcy leverage and failure may reflect a weakness in the
accounting data employed. Most firms elect "fresh-start accounting"
upon emerging from bankruptcy. This method gives them wide
discretion in fixing the postbankruptcy value of their assets. The firm
fixes that value knowing the firm's debt level and, hence, knowing
what leverage a particular assets value implies. Firms with the
highest debt levels and therefore the greatest likelihood of failure may
be the firms most likely to exaggerate their assets, obscuring the true
disparities in postbankruptcy leverage. 10 2
C. Reduction in Firm Size
Reorganization typically reduces the size of the firm. As part of
their reorganizations, firms close divisions, discontinue product lines,
sell assets, and lay off employees. Often, the strategy is to retain and
continue to operate the most successful parts of the business.10 3 One
might plausibly suppose that reorganizations involving greater
reductions in firm size would succeed more often.
102. Earlier research provides some support for this possibility. Michel, Shaked, and
McHugh found refilers more likely than nonrefilers to make overly positive financial projections.
Allen Michel et al., Chapter 22s: Lessons of Two-Time Bankruptcies, 6 FINANCIER 10 (1999).
103. That is not invariably true. In its 1982 reorganization, Lionel Corporation sold the most
successful part of its business-Dale Electronics-and attempted to reorganize around the
remainder. Committee of Equity Security Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d
1063, 1065 (2d Cir. 1983) ("Dale is Lionel's most valuable single asset. Unlike Lionel's toy
retailing operation, Dale is profitable."); Lionel Corp. v. Dynamics of America (In re Lionel
Corp.), 38 B.R. 679 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (explaining that Dale was sold as a part of plan of
reorganization). Lionel refiled in 1991. LoPucki, supra note 2, at http://lopucki.law-lib.ucla.edu.
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In testing that hypothesis, we employed three measures of
reduction in size: reduction in assets, reduction in sales, and reduction
in numbers of employees. In each measure, we used the last-available
figure for a period prior to filing and the first-available figure for a
period after confirmation. We expressed the reduction as a percentage
of the prefiling figure. Thus, a firm that shrank from one hundred to
sixty had a 40% reduction in size by that measure. In our calculations,
we ignored firms with fewer than ten employees. 10 4
None of the relationships between shrinkage and plan failure is
significant. Reductions in assets, sales, or employees do not predict
refiling or plan failure. Nor are they correlated with postbankruptcy
earnings.
D. Prepackaging
We considered a bankruptcy case "prepackaged" if the debtor
proposed its plan to creditors, solicited their votes, and received the
necessary acceptances prior to filing the bankruptcy case. We grouped
all remaining cases-including those "prenegotiated" with some or all
creditors before filing-together as "nonprepackaged."
We found that debtors reorganized in prepackaged cases had
lower postbankruptcy earnings than debtors reorganized in
nonprepackaged cases. 10 5 By this measure, prepackaged reorgani-
zations are more likely to fail than nonprepackaged reorganizations.
One might argue that this difference could be explained, in
whole or in part, by speed instead of failure. 10 6 To understand how
that could occur, imagine two debtors whose financial conditions are
identical and who, at the moment of the filings of their petitions, have
taken identical steps to improve them. Further assume that the
improvements resulting from the steps will not appear in earnings
until the second year after implementation. If one of the debtors files a
prepackaged case, one year of unimproved earnings would be included
in our calculation of the debtor's average annual earnings for the five
years after bankruptcy. If the other debtor files a nonprepackaged
104. As a result, we ignored two firms: Commonwealth Equity increased its number of
employees from 1 to 440, and EUA Power increased its number of employees from 1 to 2. For
neither firm was the number of employees indicative of firm size. Both firms were operated
principally by persons employed by others and "rented" to the firm. Commonwealth's sharp
increase was merely the transfer of employees from the books of an outside contractor to
Commonwealth's own books.
105. N = 94, F = 8.053, df = 1, p = .006.
106. Other researchers have noted the correlation between the speed and failure of
reorganizations. Michel et al., supra note 102 (finding that the median length of time in Chapter
11 is more than twice as long for one-time filers than for the first Chapter 11 of two-time filers).
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case and remains in bankruptcy for a year, that debtor's year of
unimproved earnings would not be included in our calculation because
it occurred prior to confirmation.
This argument, however, is not convincing. Prepackaged
reorganizations do not begin at the filing of the bankruptcy case. They
are negotiated and voted upon, just as are nonprepackaged
reorganizations. The difference is that the prepackaged bankruptcy is
filed after the negotiation and voting have taken place, while the
nonprepackaged bankruptcy is filed before the negotiation and voting
taken place. Professsors Tashjian, Lease, and McConnell found that
from the initial restructuring announcement to the resolution of
financial distress, prepackaged cases (at 21.6 months) were only 25%
shorter than traditional Chapter 11 cases (at 28.5 months). 10 7
If steps are taken in conjunction with reorganization to
improve earnings, in prepackaged cases those steps would occur before
or during the period of plan formulation, just as they would in
nonprepackaged cases. Thus, improvements in a prepackaged case
would yield results at about the same time (in relation to plan
confirmation) as would the improvements in a nonprepackaged case.
We also tested the relationship between prepackaging and
success by two other measures of success-refiling and plan failures.
Neither of those measures would be sensitive to the problem of timing
just discussed. We found that 26% of the twenty-seven prepackaged
reorganizations led to refiling within five years, as compared to 13% of
the seventy-one nonprepackaged reorganizations. The difference is not
statistically significant.108 But using plan failure as the measure, 44%
of the prepackaged bankruptcies failed, compared to 21% of the
nonprepackaged bankruptcies. This difference is highly significant. 0 9
We conclude that prepackaged reorganizations are more prone to
failure than nonprepackaged reorganizations.
107. Tashjian et al., supra note 90, at 142.
108. F = 2.527, df= 1, p = .115.
109. F = 5.520, df= 1, p = .021.
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Table 17: Prepackaged Cases by Court
Delaware New York Other Courts Total
Nonprepackaged 46% 81% 82% 72%
Prepackaged 54% 19% 18% 28%
N 26 16 56 98
Pearson chi-square = 12,264, p = .002
Table 17 shows that Delaware received a greater proportion of
prepackaged cases than did New York or Other Courts. Because
prepackaging occurs before the case is filed, some might consider
prepackaging to be exogenous to the court in which the case is filed.
We consider prepackaging endogenous partly on the basis of anecdotal
evidence that cases are prepackaged with particular courts in mind.
From the beginning-long before filing-the reorganization process is
linked to the culture and procedures of the Delaware bankruptcy
court.
Delaware's prepackaged reorganizations fail at a much higher
rate than prepackaged reorganizations in other courts (Table 18).
Except in Delaware, prepackaged cases did not result in refilings at
all. Moreover, the rate of plan failure in Delaware among prepackaged
cases is very high (64%), nearly twice that of New York and more than
three times the rate in Other Courts.
Nonprepackaged cases also fail at higher rates in Delaware
than in Other Courts, but the difference in rates is not as great as the
difference for prepackaged cases. Measured by refiling or plan failure,
Delaware and New York have roughly equivalent failure rates in
nonprepackaged cases, and those rates are significantly higher than
the failure rates in Other Courts.
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Table 18: Failure Rates by Court and by Prepackaged Status
Prepackaged Nonprepackaged
Plan Plan
Court Refilings Fan Cases Refilings Failures CasesFailures Fiue
Delaware 7 9 14 4 5 12
50% 64% 33% 42%
New York 0 1 3 3 4 13
0% 33% 23% 31%
Other Courts 0 2 10 2 6 46
0% 20% 4% 13%
Total 7 12 27 9 15 71
26% 44% 100% 13% 21% 100%
Cell entries are numbers and percentages of cases in each court that failed
(p-values relate to differences between courts within columns).
p = .009 p = .095 p =.011 p = .062
That Delaware's difference from Other Courts is not as great
with respect to nonprepackaged cases as with respect to prepackaged
cases, together with the very low rates of prepackaged case failure in
Other Courts, lends support to our decision to treat prepackaging as
endogenous to the court. If prepackaging rather than association with
Delaware were driving Delaware's high failure rates, we would expect
to see more prepackaged case failures in Other Courts. We conclude
that something about the manner in which Delaware processes
prepackaged cases is contributing to Delaware's high failure rates.
E. Speed
The conventional wisdom holds that Delaware processes
reorganization cases faster than other courts and that debtors seeking
quick reorganization choose Delaware for that reason.110 Examining a
universe of cases very similar to that examined in the instant study,111
110. E.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Judges and Bankruptcy Venue: Some Thoughts on
Delaware, 1 DEL. L. REV. 1, 20 (1998) ("Rather than lengthy cases, Delaware is known for its
speedy confirmation of reorganization plans."); id. at 27 ("Delaware's judges also tend to confirm
traditional Chapter 11 cases much more quickly than judges in other districts. Venue shopping
in bankruptcy has thus produced a clientele effect, with Delaware attracting firms that seek to
reorganize quickly."); id. at 28 (stating that "Delaware has successfully addressed the single
biggest problem with Chapter 11 in recent years-the inordinate time and expense of the
reorganization process").
111. Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 4, at 973-75. Both studies examined universes of cases
drawn from the same source, Lynn M. LoPucki's Bankruptcy Research Database, see supra note
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Eisenberg and LoPucki found that Delaware did have slightly lower
mean and median case-processing times than Other Courts. 112 But
after controlling for whether the cases were prepackaged, the
differences were not significant. 1 3
Prepackaged cases are quick and fail at a higher rate. To
determine whether the speed of reorganizations-apart from the
speed achieved by prepackaging-affects the failure rate, we began by
calculating the number of days from filing to confirmation in each of
the ninety-eight cases. We then tested this variable against our three
measures of success, controlling for prepackaged status.
Table 19: Effect of the Speed of Reorganization on Plan
Failure, Controlling for Prepackaged Bankruptcies
Dependent Variables
Plan Failure Refile
Predictor Variables I II III IV
(Speed) (Speed and (Speed) (Speed and
Prepack) Prepack)
Days (natural log) -.5384** -.7898* -.4164* -.5790
Mean = 5.641, sd = 1.262 (.1876) (.3996) (.2164) (.4699)
Prepack -.7452 -.4789
Mean =.276 (1.0295) (1.2158)
Constant 1.9757* 3.5805 .6228 1.6622
(1.0236) (2.4574) (1.1599) (2.8916)
Nagelkerke R2 .124 .131 .064 .067
N 98 98 98 98
Cells include logit coefficients (standard errors in parentheses).
**p < .01, *p < .05
We found that speed of reorganization is significantly
correlated with both plan failure and refiling (Table 19). The
relationship to plan failure is the stronger of the two; it remains
highly significant even when controlling for the influence of
prepackaged cases (Column II). Faster reorganizations are
significantly more likely to fail than slower ones, and this relationship
holds irrespective of whether the cases were prepackaged. In practical
2. Eisenberg and LoPucki's study examined cases filed after 1989, Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra
note 4, at 989, and before 1998, id. at 978, while the instant study examines cases confirmed
from 1991 through 1996.
112. Eisenberg & LoPucki, supra note 4, at 989.
113. Id.
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terms, the regression model predicts that a firm whose bankruptcy
process lasts 100 days has a 44% chance of failing, a bankruptcy that
lasts 200 days has a 31% chance of failing, and a bankruptcy that
lasts 500 days has an 18% chance of failing, controlling for
prepackaging.
When success is measured by refiling, speed of reorganization
and prepackaging are correlated, and the inclusion of both in the same
model leaves neither of them individually significant (Column IV). The
unchanged Nagelkerke R-squared indicates that the two variables in
tandem provide some explanatory power for the incidence of refiling.
F. Plan Complexity
As discussed in Part IV.A.2.b, we collected data on the number
of classes of claims and interests receiving separate distributions
under each reorganization plan. We collected these "plan classes" data
in the belief that they would reflect the complexity of the firms' capital
structures. We found that the number of plan classes was related to
success and that the relationship ran in seemingly the wrong
direction: the "easier" reorganizations-those involving fewer
classes-failed more often.114
The relationship of number: of plan classes to court is even
stronger. Delaware and New York cases averaged 12.6 and 15.5
classes per plan respectively, while Other Court cases averaged 17.7
classes per plan. The difference is significant. 115
Separation of the plan class data by prepackaged status reveals
two striking aspects. First, for all courts combined, the average
number of classes in nonprepackaged cases is considerably higher
than the average number in prepackaged cases (Table 20). This
difference is significant and not surprising. 116 Prepackaged plans
typically target shareholders and subordinate bondholders while
paying other classes in full. Because those other classes are paid in
full, many differences among them can be ignored. The most striking
aspect of these data, however, is that in Delaware the average number
of classes in a nonprepackaged plan is no larger than the number of
classes in a prepackaged plan. Delaware nonprepackaged plans are as
simple as Delaware prepackaged plans.
114. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
115. N = 95, F = 5.132, df= 1, p = .008.
116. p =.026.
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Table 20: Plan Classes in Prepackaged and Nonprepackaged
Cases by Court
Average Number of Plan Classes
Nonprepackaged N Prepackaged N
Court Cases Cases
Delaware 12.4 12 12.8 14
New York 15.7 13 14.9 3
Other Courts 18.8 44 13.7 10
Total 16.9 69 13.4 27
F = 4.085, df= 2, p = .021 F = .214, df = 2, p= .809
We consider it implausible that these data could reflect
differences in capital structure. If they did, the slightly larger firms
reorganizing in Delaware and New York would have much simpler
capital structures than the smaller firms reorganizing in Other
Courts, and in Other Courts (but not in Delaware), firms would be
choosing whether to prepackage their cases on the basis of the
complexity of their capital structures. We can think of no explanation
that fits the data in these regards.
Rather, we think that Delaware's and New York's smaller
number of plan classes reflects a difference in reorganization practices
in those two courts. The firms have similar arrays of creditors and
shareholders, but in Delaware and New York the plans divide them
into fewer classes. That practice may reflect some other variable that
contributes to the higher refiling rates in Delaware and New York.
Another possibility is that division of the creditors and
shareholders among more classes results in more thoughtful
consideration of the plan. If all claims are placed in a single class, that
class must approve the plan by a majority in number of claims and
two-thirds in amount of claims. 117 Under that arrangement, one type
of claim may outvote another. If each type of claim is placed in a
different class, each class must approve the plan by a majority in
number of claims and two-thirds in amount of claims. 1 8 Types of
claims that could have been outvoted under a one-class plan may
effectively have veto power under a multiclass plan. 1 9 This veto power
117. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (2000).
118. See § 1129(a)(8)(A) (requiring that the court confirm a plan only if each class of
impaired claims has accepted the plan).
119. This veto power is not absolute, because the court can employ cramdown against a
dissenting plan in particular circumstances. See § 1129(b)(2) (specifying the requirements for
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may result in the inclusion of more parties in plan negotiations and
the consideration of more points of view. 120 The result may be better
plans.
G. Multiple Regression Analysis
Table 21: Multiple Regression Analysis of Plan Failure and
Refiling with Endogenous Factors
Plan Failure Refiling
I II III IV V
Leverage After .407 .364 .178 .651 1.617
Filing (adjusted for (1.172) (1.196) (1.381) (1.450) (1.968)
industry)
Firm Shrinkage .047 -.003 .120 .049 -.088
(.111) (.113) (.131) (.135) (.186)
Days in Bankruptcy -.814t -.652 -.748 -.185 -.061
(natural log) (.479) (.491) (.596) (.619) (.804)
Number of Plan -.857 -.614 -.801 -.323 .705
Classes (natural log) (.676) (.714) (.821) (.907) (1.235)
Prepackaged -.776 -.745 -.546 -. 182 -.368
Bankruptcy (1.149) (1.185) (1.380) (1.447) (1.717)
Delaware 1.391* 2.559** 2.628*
(.630) (.921) (1.298)
New York
1.007 .598 .501
(.765) (1.283) (1.586)
Postbankruptcy -19.879**
Earnings (adjusted (6.287)
for firm size)
Constant 5.918* 3.722 4.620 -1.216 5.374
(2.921) (3.145) (3.569) (4.068) (5.590)
cramdown). But cramdown is uncommon, and when it occurs the cramdown process itself will
assure careful consideration of the plan.
120. See also Ernst Maug & Bilge Yilmaz, Two-Class Voting: A Mechanism for Conflict
Resolution? (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (arguing that when classes
have differing interests and information, two-class voting is superior to one-class voting, because
classes reveal more information through voting).
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Plan Failure Refiling
I II III IV V
N 90 90 87 87 87
Nagelkerke R2  0.21 0.28 0.16 0.33 0.63
Block X 2 = 14.09 X2 = 5.431 X2 = 8.303 X 2 = 10.26 X2 = 21.62
Goodness of Fit df = 5 df = 2 df = 5 df = 2 df = 1
p =.015 p .066 p =.140 p = .006 p =.000
Hosmer & Lemeshow X2 = 6.086 2= 10.416 X2 = 9.869 X2 = 8.286 X2 = 7.898
Goodness of Fit df = 8 df = 8 df = 8 df = 8 df = 8
p =. 6 3 8 p = .237 p =. 2 7 4 p = .406 p = .444
Cell entries are logistic regression coefficients (standard errors in parentheses).
**p < .01, *p < .05, 1p <.10
Table 21 reports a multivariate analysis of the factors we
consider endogenous to the bankruptcy process. These include factors
addressed above in this section plus court location. (We include
postbankruptcy earnings in the analysis of refilings, but not in the
analysis of plan failure. 121) The regression is designed to test the
following proposition: Certain factors endogenous to the bankruptcy
process increase the likelihood that the firm will fail again within five
years. Delaware's high failure rate can be explained by the presence of
these factors in Delaware cases, but the presence of these factors in
cases outside of Delaware will increase the likelihood of plan failure
there as well. To test this proposition we built a model that estimates
the influence of the endogenous factors that we consider the most
likely causes of emerging company failure: postbankruptcy leverage
(adjusted for industry), firm shrinkage, 122 the number of days between
bankruptcy filing and plan confirmation, the complexity of the
reorganization (here represented by the number of plan classes),
whether or not the bankruptcy was prepackaged, and
postconfirmation income (for the refiling models only).
If the proposition is true, we should find statistically significant
relationships between the endogenous factors and the two measures of
failure. That is, if the factors are independent of court location, they
will remain significant when the model controls for court location.
121. Postconfirmation income is used to compute the dependent variable "plan failure," and
to include it in the model would be to confirm a tautology.
122. Firm shrinkage is an index constructed from three variables: asset shrinkage, employee
shrinkage, and sales shrinkage. These were standardized using Z-scores and subjected to
reliability analysis to determine the suitability of their inclusion in an index (Cronbach's alpha =
.85) before they were added together to create a single variable.
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The regression analysis suggests that the proposition is false
with respect to plan failure. The endogenous factors, as a block,
explain some of the variance in plan outcomes. 123 While three factors
were found to be significant in bivariate analyses-days in
bankruptcy, number of plan classes, and prepackaging-only days in
bankruptcy approaches statistical significance in the regression. This
finding suggests that the three variables are correlated with each
other and that, of the three, days in bankruptcy bear the strongest
relationship to plan failure.
The addition of court location improves the model fit (Model
II),124 but not significantly.' 25 Court location is the lone significant
factor in the regression, which suggests that court location is
correlated with the other factors and is a better predictor of plan
failure than the other factors. In other words, the relationship
between the endogenous variables and plan failure is not independent
of court location. 26 Location of the case in Delaware appears to be the
cause of plan failure. 127
Models III and IV present a similar analysis of refiling. The
relationship between endogenous factors and refiling does not support
the proposition above. While days in bankruptcy and number of plan
classes were both significant in bivariate analysis, none of the five
individual variables in the block has a statistically significant
relationship to refiling. The entire block of endogenous variables
cannot be said to be correlated with refiling at conventionally
acceptable levels of significance (Model III).128
Delaware court location was significantly related to refiling in
a bivariate analysis, and the relationship between Delaware court
location and refiling remains significant after controlling for the block
of endogenous factors (Model IV). Since none of the factors is
significantly related to refiling, we conclude that there is no support
123. Model I: Nagelkerke R2 = .21, Block Goodness of Fit p = .015.
124. Nagelkerke R2 = .28.
125. Block Goodness of Fit p = .066.
126. To put it another way, the number of failures outside Delaware is insufficient to
establish that any of the variables tested is a cause of failure independent of Delaware.
127. Another way to analyze these is to reverse the model-building process by inserting court
location into Model I, and adding the endogenous factors into Model II. This procedure would test
whether the endogenous variables improve the fit of the model after controlling for court
location. We ran that test, and the block of endogenous variables did not improve the fit
significantly (X2 = 6.305, df = 5, p = .278).
128. p = .140.
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for the proposition; none of the endogenous factors have independent
explanatory power after controlling for court location.129
When postbankruptcy earnings are added to the model, they
are highly correlated with the probability of refiling (Model V). Firms
with relatively poor earnings after they emerge from bankruptcy are
more likely to refile than firms with relatively good earnings. 130 Poor
earnings are an apparent cause of refilings, and the presence of this
factor outside of Delaware increases the likelihood of refiling there as
well. Delaware court location remains significant in Model V,
indicating that firms reorganizing in Delaware are more likely to
refile, even controlling for postbankruptcy earnings and the block of
endogenous factors. The significance of the refiling rate in Delaware
becomes apparent when the logistic regression coefficients are
converted into probabilities. Controlling for the independent effect of
the other variables, Delaware bankruptcies were three times more
likely to refile (29% probability) than either New York (10%
probability) or Other Court (8% probability) bankruptcies. We
conclude that poor postbankruptcy earnings operate independently of
Delaware to cause refilings-hardly a startling proposition. More
interestingly, Delaware court location operates independently of
postbankruptcy earnings and the block of endogenous variables to
cause refilings. That suggests that as-yet-untested characteristics of
Delaware reorganization also contribute significantly to Delaware's
high refiling and failure rates.
H. Conclusions
Commentators seeking to explain the failure of bankruptcy
reorganizations focus on two problems. The firms, they say, emerged
with too much leverage or without correcting the problems that made
the firms' businesses unprofitable. Our findings are consistent with
those explanations. The data we gathered regarding leverage and
profitability show that the problems of leverage and losses are more
often present in firms emerging from Delaware reorganization than in
firms emerging from reorganization in Other Courts. The data also
129. One should not conclude from our model that these factors do not operate independently
of court location. The numbers of non-Delaware failures may simply have been too small to
document the factors' independent operation.
130. It might be argued that high leverage leads to lower postbankruptcy earnings, and that
leverage is therefore an equal culprit when it comes to refiling. There is some support for this
proposition in the data. The correlation between postbankruptcy earnings and leverage is nearly
significant by conventional standards (Pearson's R = -. 19, p = .06). On the other hand, this
relationship is so weak that high leverage should be skeptically viewed (except for extreme cases)
as a secondary or tertiary causal factor in refiling, not a primary one.
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suggest that the cause of these differences lies not in the kinds of
cases coming to Delaware, but in the effect that Delaware has on those
cases. Before bankruptcy, the firms that file in Delaware were
indistinguishable from those that file in Other Courts. By the time
they emerged, however, they had slightly higher leverage and
significantly lower earnings.
The data also show two other differences between the Delaware
process and the processes of Other Courts that may help to explain
Delaware's higher failure rates. First, prepackaged cases failed at
much higher rates in Delaware than they did in Other Courts.
Because Delaware also gets a higher proportion of prepackaged cases
than Other Courts, prepackaged cases contributed substantially to
Delaware's higher failure rates.
Second, nonprepackaged Delaware plans divide creditors and
shareholders into fewer classes than do nonprepackaged Other Court
plans, and it appears that plans with fewer classes fail more often. We
doubt something so superficial as the number of plan classes could
contribute significantly to plan failure. As a result, we think the
causal relationship probably runs in another direction: some aspect of
the Delaware process that contributes to failure also causes simplicity
in Delaware plans.
Two additional conclusions can be drawn from the results in
Table 21. First, controlling for Delaware court location, the measure of
postbankruptcy earnings is the only endogenous factor that
contributes significantly to failure independent of court location. This
finding is consistent with the thesis that Delaware has higher failure
rates because Delaware fails more often to fix the debtor's business.
Second, Delaware court location is a better predictor of failure than
the block of endogenous variables that were correlated with failure in
bivariate testing. Something more is going on in Delaware than the
variables we identified and tested.
VII. CONCLUSIONS, SPECULATIONS, AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE
RESEARCH
The data on failure show that Delaware reorganizations fail
more often. The data on leverage and earnings show that the financial
condition of Delaware-reorganizing firms is similar to that of Other
Court-reorganizing firms when they enter bankruptcy but
significantly worse when they exit. These findings suggest it is the
Delaware process rather than the condition of the firms entering that
process that causes Delaware's higher failure rate.
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To be sure, these findings do not prove that either the
Delaware court or the Delaware process is responsible. Skeptics can
still posit the existence of an "Omitted Variable that Would Save
Delaware. ' 131  For example, they might posit some defect
disproportionately present in Delaware-reorganizing firms that makes
them more difficult to reorganize sucessfully, but which is latent. That
is, the defect is one that would not increase prefiling leverage or
depress prefiling earnings. But as the data accumulate, the putative
omitted variables must become increasingly complex and implausible
to sustain such a view.
The data alone are not yet sufficient to tell us what caused
Delaware's higher failure rates. But when combined with data from
other studies and anecdotal evidence, they do provide support for the
following speculations.
Delaware's bankruptcy court operates on an unabashedly
laissez-faire philosophy. If the parties are in agreement on a plan, the
court will confirm it. This statement is generally true for Other Courts
as well. Plans considered at a confirmation hearing are almost
invariably confirmed in all courts. But even though Other Courts
confirm plans at substantially the same high rate as Delaware, the
manner in which they confirm them may nevertheless be more
effective. 132
The Bankruptcy Code requires that the courts make findings
that plans are feasible before confirming them. 133 In response,
virtually all courts require expert testimony of plan feasibilty. Plan
proponents are usually under great pressure to succeed at the
confirmation hearing. As a result, they may take the issue of
feasibility more seriously in courts they know to be more demanding-
or, perhaps more to the point, in courts about which they know
nothing-than in the high-volume,' pro-confirmation, laissez-faire
courts of Delaware and New York. Other Courts' reorganization
processes may require greater feasibility than Delaware's, even if
Other Courts' judges do not.
Several other factors suggest that the Delaware reorganization
process is less thorough than that of Other Courts. Our data show that
the Delaware process is quicker. Unpublished data show that the
131. See LoPucki, supra note 71, at 341-44 (discussing possible omitted variables).
132. LoPucki and Kalin found that Delaware confirmed plans in 37 of 38 cases (97%), while
Other Courts confirmed plans in 111 of 117 cases (95%). LoPucki & Kalin, supra note 1, at 256.
The intensity of the court's scrutiny of plans is probably more important to the process than is
the likelihood that the plan will ultimately be confirmed.
133. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (2000) (requiring that confirmation of the plan is not likely
to be followed by liquidation or further reorganization).
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Delaware process is slightly less expensive than that of Other
Courts-even though professionals appear to be paid at higher rates
in Delaware and Delaware requires local counsel in every case.13 4
Some bankruptcy lawyers and judges have told us that the Delaware
Bankruptcy Court discourages adversary proceedings and objections
to claims.
The same as-yet-unpublished professional fee data also show a
provocative difference in fee distributions between Delaware and
Other Courts. In Delaware, approximately 60% of the fees go to
financial advisers; in Other Courts, the proportion is approximately
40%.
Together, these data suggest that broad-brush investment
bankers rather than meticulous lawyers may dominate Delaware
reorganization. They may spend less time, pay less attention to detail,
and therefore finish more quickly. This possibility is consistent with
the greater simplicity of Delaware plans.
The cause of Delaware's higher failure rates appears to lie in
Delaware's less effective reorganization procedures. Assuming that is
the case, the challenge for future researchers is to discover and
document the source of this market failure. The question future
researchers must answer is why so many sophisticated parties with
even more sophisticated advisers choose to take their cases to the
court least likely to reorganize their firms successfully.
We speculate that at the core of this market failure is the
parties' desire to appear to reorganize without in fact doing so.
Effective reorganization is unpleasant. Managers must at least
acknowledge their past failures and perhaps also resign their
positions. Creditors must accept substantial reductions in the
amounts owed to them. The interests of shareholders must be finally
and permanently extinguished. All parties hope to benefit from the
bankruptcy court's certification that the firm has faced up to its
problems and resolved them, but no party wants the firm to actually
face up to its problems. So far, the Delaware bankruptcy court's
certification has not only been cheap, quick, and easy to obtain, but it
has also had even greater credibility than the certification of other
courts. The issue now may be whether it can retain that credibility in
the face of the evidence accumulating against it.
134. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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